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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-one percent of adults in the United States—more
1
than sixty-five million Americans—have at least one tattoo.
2
For those under age forty, that percentage nearly doubles. Not
surprisingly, the tattoo business is booming. By some estimates, the U.S. tattoo industry generates $2.3 billion in annual
3
revenue. Once the mark of sailors, convicts, and circus per4
formers, the tattoo has infiltrated mainstream society.
Despite its countercultural origins, the tattoo industry
shares much in common with other, more familiar creative in5
dustries. Fundamentally, it capitalizes on market demand for
6
original creative works. Yet as public goods, the value of those
7
works is readily appropriable through copying. Predictably,
copying is both a practical reality and a source of concern with8
in the industry. But unlike their counterparts in most other
creative industries, tattooers nearly uniformly reject formal legal mechanisms for adjudicating claims over ownership and
1. See One in Five U.S. Adults Now Has a Tattoo, HARRIS INTERACTIVE
(Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris%20Poll%2022%
20-Tattoos_2.23.12.pdf.
2. See Tattooed Gen Nexters, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE &
THE PRESS (Dec. 9, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/daily-number/tattooed-gen
-nexters (noting that 36% of adults between eighteen and twenty-five and 40%
of those between twenty-six and forty currently have, or previously had, a tattoo).
3. Max Chafkin, King Ink, INC. (Nov. 1, 2007), http://www.inc.com/
magazine/20071101/king-ink.html. This estimate, based on 2007 data, likely
significantly underestimates current industry revenue.
4. In its modern form, “a tattoo is created by injecting ink into a person’s
skin. To do this, an electrically powered tattoo machine, often called a gun,
moves a solid needle up and down to puncture the skin between 50 and 3,000
times per minute. The needle penetrates the skin by about a millimeter and
deposits a drop of insoluble ink into the skin . . . .” Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010).
5. Cf. Ivan Quintanilla, Tattoos Through Time: A New Museum for Amsterdam, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2012, 6:00 AM, http://www.intransit.blogs
.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/tattoos-through-time-a-new-museum-for-amsterdam/
(discussing an Amsterdam museum opening dedicated exclusively to tattoo
art).
6. See generally David Cummings, Creative Expression and the Human
Canvas: An Examination of Tattoos as a Copyrightable Art Form, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 279 (2013) (arguing that tattooers’ work is capable of satisfying the
statutory requirements for copyrightability).
7. Id. at 307.
8. See Interview with Subject 2, Compiled Transcripts with Anonymous
Tattooers at 19 (May 5–June 1, 2012) (on file with author).
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9

copying. Although tattoos fall squarely within the protections
of the Copyright Act, copyright law plays virtually no part in
10
the day-to-day operation of the tattoo industry. Instead,
tattooers rely on a set of informal social norms to structure creative production and mediate relationships within their indus11
try.
Following in the tradition of earlier scholarship exploring
12
the intersection of intellectual property law and social norms,
this Article sets out with three objectives: to provide a descriptive account of the norms related to creative production within
the tattoo industry; to explain both the industry’s choice to
forego formal assertions of legal rights and the particular content of the norms it has embraced; and to consider the implications of this case study for intellectual property law and policy
more generally.
But this Article differs from much of the prior work on intellectual property and social norms in two ways. First, the tattoo industry norms reported here represent the first example of
market-driven informal alternatives to intellectual property
law that emerged despite fully applicable formal protections.
Unlike norms that emerge in the shadow of some barrier to
13
meaningful intellectual property protection, tattoo industry
norms function as an informal system of community govern-

9. Practitioners in the tattoo industry refer to themselves by a number of
terms, including “tattooists,” “tattoo artists,” and “tattooers.” See Interview
with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 16; id. with Subject 13 at 144. While these
terms sometimes reflect subtle shades of meaning, I will refer to them as
“tattooers,” the term most commonly used by my interview subjects.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1643, 1661 (1996) (explaining that norms exist when members of a group
are obligated to do something under certain conditions or face some sanction).
12. See, e.g., David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property
Norms Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012);
Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property
Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCIENCE 187 (2008); Jacob Loshin,
Secrets Revealed: How Magicians Protect Intellectual Property without Law, in
LAW & MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010);
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up
Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008).
13. See Loshin, supra note 12, at 125–30; Fauchart & von Hippel, supra
note 12, at 187–91; Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1799–1805; see also
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 317, 322–25 (2011).
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ance that developed despite an applicable body of formal law.
And unlike norms governing nonmarket behavior, tattoo industry norms prevail despite the same profit motive characteristic
15
of many creative fields.
Second, tattoo industry norms are unique because they
must account for a more complex set of relationships than those
observed in earlier case studies. Tattooers must establish
norms that govern not only their interactions with each other,
but with clients who play an important role in the creation and
16
use of their works as well. Further complicating matters,
aside from copying within their industry, tattooers are faced
17
with the question of the propriety of copying outside of it. This
overlapping complex of relationships between tattooers, clients,
and the broader art world yields a correspondingly rich, nu18
anced, and perhaps contradictory set of creative norms.
Part I of this Article offers a brief history of the practice of
tattooing—beginning with its widespread use in early civilizations, then turning to its colonial reincorporation into the West,
19
and the recent emergence of the “tattoo renaissance.” This
Part will also introduce the basic structure and vocabulary of
the contemporary tattoo industry.
After establishing the doctrinal applicability and practical
irrelevance of formal copyright law to tattoos, Part II catalogs
the norms that structure the tattoo industry. To develop this
descriptive account, I conducted fourteen in-person qualitative
interviews in early 2012 with tattooers throughout the United
14. See infra Part II.
15. David Fagundes, for example, has described the norms governing roller derby pseudonyms. See Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1108–31. Because such
noms de guerre are registerable as service marks, those norms serve as an alternative to, rather than a substitute for, formal law. Id. at 1114–15. But they
emerge in large part because of the non-market volunteerism that defines the
roller derby community. Id. at 1140–43.
16. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 19.
17. Others have described norms that distinguish between obligations
owed to those within a community and obligations owed to those outside of it.
See Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 156 (2007) (discussing norms within
fan communities).
18. See Tattoos Conquer Modern Art as Needles and Ink Replace Brushes,
THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/
23/tattoo-artists-new-york (discussing the “intimate client relationships”
maintained by tattooers and the tattoo industry’s “fractured” interaction with
the modern art world).
19. See generally Arnold Rubin, The Tattoo Renaissance, in MARKS OF
CIVILIZATION 233 (Arnold Rubin ed., 1988).
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States, identified through snowball sampling relying on exist20
ing industry contacts. In terms of geography, gender, experience level, work environment, style, and clientele, these interviews capture a diverse, if not necessarily representative, cross
21
section of perspectives within the tattoo community.
These interviews revealed five core norms. First, tattooers
as a rule recognize the autonomy interests of their clients both
in the design of custom tattoos and their subsequent display
and use. Second, tattooers collectively refrain from reusing custom designs—that is, a tattooer who designs an image for a client will not apply that same image on another client. Third,
tattooers discourage the copying of custom designs—that is, a
tattooer generally will not apply another tattooer’s custom images to a willing client. Fourth, tattooers create and use predesigned tattoo imagery, or “flash,” with the understanding
that it will be freely reproduced. Finally, tattooers generally
embrace the copying of works that originate outside of the tattoo industry, such as paintings, photos, or illustrations. In some
ways, these norms unintentionally echo familiar concepts from
copyright law, but they differ from formal law in important respects as well.
Part III offers a number of complementary explanations for
the content of tattoo industry norms and the industry’s reliance
upon them. Both the culture and economics of the tattoo industry gave rise to its particular set of norms. Tattooers share a
disdain for authority and a history of harsh legal regulation
that renders them generally hostile to the legal system. Perhaps more importantly, as a deeply client-driven enterprise,
the tattoo industry is sensitive to consumer expectations. Those
expectations provide strong incentives for the development of
norms in order to preserve the industry’s collective interest in
the continued viability of the market for custom tattoos. Finally, tattoo norms also erect barriers to entry to the increasingly
crowded field of tattooers, revealing the guild-like nature of the
industry.
Part IV concludes by considering the broader lessons the
tattoo industry offers for intellectual property law and policy.
The tattoo industry’s success reveals the importance of custom20. Snowball sampling is a “nonrandom sampling technique . . . in which
survey subjects are selected based on referral from other survey respondents.”
KEN BLACK, BUSINESS STATISTICS FOR CONTEMPORARY DECISION MAKING 230
(4th ed. 2004).
21. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 1.
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izing creative goods to deter widespread copying and of bundling easily copied creative goods with difficult-to-copy personal
services.
I. A HISTORY OF TATTOOS
The term “tattoo” entered the English language through
22
Captain James Cook’s accounts of his travels in Polynesia. In
1769, Cook witnessed Tahitians engaged in the practice of
“tattowing” and described it as follows:
Both sexes paint their Bodys, Tattow, as it is called in their Language. This is done by inlaying the Colour of Black under their skins,
in such a manner as to be indelible . . . . The colour they use is lamp
black, prepar’d from the Smoak of a Kind of Oily nut, used by them
instead of Candles. The instrument for pricking it under the Skin is
made of very thin flatt pieces of bone or Shell . . . . One end is cut into
sharp teeth, and the other fastened to a handle. The teeth are dipped
into black Liquor, and then drove, by quick sharp blows struck upon
23
the handle with a Stick . . . .

Cook’s account marks the beginning of the modern history of
24
the tattoo. But tattooing developed in cultures across the
globe long before the European public became fascinated with
Cook’s adventures.
This Part briefly traces the five-thousand-year history of
tattooing, from evidence of its use in pre-historic societies to the
contemporary, technology-mediated tattoo industry. This historical grounding, particularly the dramatic shift in American
tattooing over the last five decades, is central to understanding
the attitudes and norms surrounding copying within the industry today.
A. THE ORIGINS OF TATTOOING
In 1991, climbers in the Italian Alps stumbled upon the
frozen corpse of the Tyrolean Iceman, a 5300-year-old mummy
adorned with fifty-seven simple geometric tattoos made from a
25
pigment derived from soot. The Iceman was not alone among
22. C.P. Jones, Stigma and Tattoo, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 1 (Jane
Caplan ed., 2000).
23. WILLIAM J. L. WHARTON, CAPTAIN COOK’S JOURNAL DURING HIS FIRST
VOYAGE ROUND THE WORLD MADE IN H.M. BARK ‘ENDEAVOUR,’ 1768–71: A
LITERAL TRANSCRIPTION OF THE ORIGINAL MSS. WITH NOTES AND INTRODUCTION 93 (1893).
24. Jones, supra note 22, at 1.
25. Maria Anna Pabst et al., The Tattoos of the Tyrolean Iceman: A Light
Microscopical, Ultrastructural and Element Analytical Study, 36 J. ARCHAEOL.
SCI. 2335, 2335 (2009); Jennifer Viegas, Oetzi Iceman’s Tattoos Came from
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pre-historic tattoo collectors. Egyptian mummies dating back to
2100 B.C. were tattooed with a “‘dark, blackish-blue pigment
applied with a pricking instrument, perhaps consisting of one
26
or more fish bones set into a wooden handle.’” A Scythian
mummy from 500 B.C. bore elaborate depictions of animals on
27
the arms and back. And a thousand-year-old Peruvian mummy featured “ornamental tattoos depicting stylised apes, birds,
28
and reptiles on the forearms, hands, and lower legs.”
Tattooing was practiced throughout the ancient world. In
29
Japan, the evidence dates to at least the third century B.C.
The admonition in Leviticus—“[n]ever mark your skin with tat30
toos”—suggests the practice was known among the Israelites.
The Persians passed tattooing on to the Greeks, who used the
term “stigmata” to describe images “inscribed on the face or
some other part of the body . . . by pricking the places with
needles, wiping away the blood, and rubbing it in . . . the [ink]
31
preparation.” The Greeks, in turn, passed the practice on to
32
the Romans.
The social meanings of these early tattoos were as diverse
as the cultures that created them. Some tattoos were purely
33
34
ornamental. Others had ceremonial or religious functions.
35
Still others are thought to have served therapeutic purposes.
36
Some indicated high rank or social status, whereas Greek and
Fireplace, DISCOVERY NEWS (July 17, 2009, 12:48 PM), http://www.nbcnews
.com/id/31965532/ns/technology_and_science-science/t/oetzi-iceman-tatoos
-came-fireplace/#.UjjhvaXujnp.
26. Jones, supra note 22, at 2 (quoting Richard S. Bianchi, Tätowierung,
in LEXICON DER ÄGYPTOLOGIE 145–46 (W. Helck & E. Otto, VI ed., 1986)).
27. See Pabst, supra note 25, at 2337.
28. Leopold Dorfer et al., A Medical Report from the Stone Age?, 354 LANCET 1023, 1023 (1999).
29. See MARGO DEMELLO, BODIES OF INSCRIPTION: A CULTURAL HISTORY
OF THE MODERN TATTOO COMMUNITY 72 (2000); DONALD RICHIE & IAN
BURUMA, THE JAPANESE TATTOO 11 (1980).
30. LEVITICUS 28:19 (New Living Translation).
31. Jones, supra note 22, at 4–5 (quoting AETIUS AMIDENUS,
TETRABIBLON 8, 12; Alessandro Olivieri, Corpus Medicorum Graecorum VIII/2
(Berlin, 1950), pp. 417–18).
32. Jones, supra note 22, at 4–11.
33. Dorfer et al., supra note 28, at 1023.
34. See Juliet Fleming, The Renaissance Tattoo, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY
68–70 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000); Jones, supra note 22, at 13 (noting that tattoos
were often part of Christian pilgrimages to the Holy Land).
35. See Dorfer et al., supra note 28, at 1023 (noting the close correspondence between tattoos on mummified remains and acupuncture points).
36. See WILFRID DYSON HAMBLY, THE HISTORY OF TATTOOING 206–07
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Roman “stigma” were reserved for prisoners and slaves. Over
the centuries that followed, tattoos continued to serve many of
these same functions.
B. COLONIALISM & TATTOOS IN THE WEST
Tattooing was practiced in the British Isles long before
Cook’s excursions to Polynesia. The Picts, the pre-Roman inhabitants of modern-day Scotland, “receive[d] their name from
their painted . . . bodies, because they are marked by tattoos of
38
various figures made with iron pricks and black pigment.”
And in the early seventeenth century, Native Americans re39
exposed the British to tattooing. Europeans of this period encountered tattoos in Africa and Asia as well, apparently “with40
out being tempted to try it for themselves.”
That changed when Cook returned to Europe after his second circumnavigation, bearing not only accounts of Polynesian
tattooing but a living example of it. Omai, a tattooed native of
the island of Raiatea, arrived in England in 1774 onboard one
41
of Cook’s ships. Omai became something of a sensation;
“newspapers printed his life story, the most celebrated artists
painted his portrait, the popular theatre made him into a hero
and a box-office hit, and learned men counted it an honor to
42
shake his hand . . . .” More importantly, he “sparked a tattoo43
ing vogue among the English aristocracy.”

(2009) (noting the “status-giving” function of tattoos in Polynesian cultures).
37. Jones, supra note 22, at 5.
38. SAINT ISIDORE (OF SEVILLE), THE ETYMOLOGIES OF ISIDORE OF
SEVILLE 198 (Stephen A. Barney et al. trans., 2006); see also JOHN SPEED, THE
HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAINE 167 (1611) (“The Britaines . . . by means of artificial incisions of sundry formes have from their childhood divers shapes of
beasts incorporate upon them; and having their markes deeply imprinted
within their bodies . . . .”).
39. SAMUEL PURCHAS, PURCHAS HIS PILGRIMAGE 955 (1617) (describing
Algonquian women who would “pounce and raze their bodies, leggs, thighes,
and armes, in curious knots and pourtraytures of fowles, fishes, beasts and
rub a painting into the same, which will never will out.”); see also Fleming, supra note 34, at 69 (noting that “pouncing” and “razing” were English terms for
tattooing used until the mid-eighteenth century).
40. Id. at 67.
41. Harriet Guest, Curiously Marked: Tattooing and Gender Differences in
Eighteenth-Century British Perceptions of the South Pacific, in WRITTEN ON
THE BODY 83 (Jane Caplan ed. 2000).
42. Stephan Oettermann, On Display: Tattooed Entertainers in America
and Germany, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 196 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000).
43. Fleming, supra note 34, at 67.
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Initially, the European tattooed class comprised primarily
sailors, soldiers, and adventurers who traveled to Tahiti, New
44
Zealand, and other far-flung locales. Cook’s own crewmembers
were among the first Europeans to return with traditional Pol45
ynesian tattoos. And tattooing quickly spread throughout the
46
British military.
By the nineteenth century, European fashionable society
47
was “gripped by a tattoo craze.” Sutherland Macdonald and
Ted Riley opened tattoo studios where wealthy Londoners eagerly joined the newly tattooed upper class with the likes of
Queen Olga of Greece, the Duke of York, Lady Randolph
48
Churchill, and King Oscar II of Sweden.
In the United States, Martin Hildebrandt opened the first
49
professional tattoo shop in 1846 in New York. Early U.S.
tattooers like Hildebrandt and Gus Wagner relied on the same
50
basic techniques and hand tools used for thousands of years.
But in 1891, another New York tattooer, Samuel O’Reilly, invented the tattoo machine, a device that fundamentally re-

44. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 49.
45. Id. at 45; Harriet Guest, Curiously Marked: Tattooing, Masculinity,
and Nationality in Eighteenth Century British Perceptions of the South Pacific,
in PAINTING AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE: NEW ESSAYS ON BRITISH ART
1700–1850, at 130–31 (John Barrell ed., 1992) (describing the “inauguration of
the nautical tradition” of tattooing in the eighteenth century).
46. For example, Lord Roberts, who was tattooed during his military service in Burma, encouraged tattoos among his officers. James Bradley, Body
Commodification? Class and Tattoos in Victorian Britain, in WRITTEN ON THE
BODY 145 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000).
47. Id. at 145–46.
48. Id. Of course, tattoos were not found exclusively among members of
high society. During this period, relatively crude and inexpensive tattoos could
be found among “sailors, dockers, and other rough diamonds”—as well as
criminals and convicts—throughout Europe. Id. at 141 (quoting GEORGE
BURCHETT, MEMOIRS OF A TATTOOIST 13,139 (1958)); see also Jane Caplan,
National Tattooing, Traditions of Tattooing in Nineteenth-Century Europe, in
WRITTEN ON THE BODY 156–57 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000) (discussing tattoos
among German and Italian criminals); Hamish Maxwell Stewart & Ian Duffield, Skin Deep Devotions: Religious Tattoos and Convict Transportation to
Australia, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 118 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000); Abby M.
Schrader, Branding the Other/Tattooing the Self: Bodily Inscription among
Convicts in Russia and the Soviet Union, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 184–85
(Jane Caplan ed., 2000); DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 50.
49. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 49.
50. Alan Govenar, The Changing Image of Tattooing in American Culture,
1846–1966, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 214–15 (Jane Caplan ed., 2000).
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51

shaped tattooing. The introduction of electric machinery made
52
tattooing cheaper, faster, and less painful. It also helped develop a distinctive American aesthetic characterized by “strong
black line . . . heavy black shading; and a dab of color” from a
53
limited palette emphasizing red, blue, and green.
Tattooers in the United States were generally from the
54
same working class backgrounds as their clients and typically
55
had no prior art training. Rather than create custom artwork
for their clients, tattooers of this era worked almost exclusively
56
from collections of pre-drawn images called “flash.” Designs
included military insignia, ships, hearts, flowers, skulls, dag57
gers, snakes, tigers, Christian icons, and scantily clad women.
These same images, or minor variations on them, hung on the
58
walls of nearly every tattoo shop of the era. When a tattooer
came across an appealing new design, he copied it—sometimes
directly off of the body of a willing client—and added it to his
59
stock of flash. Some enterprising tattooers, first among them
Lew Alberts and Charlie Western, sold sheets of flash to other
60
tattooers.
The combination of the electric tattoo machine and simple,
pre-made flash designs enabled the industry to capitalize on
61
the popularity of tattoos during the Interbellum period. In
many ways, the tattoo industry was structured around the
needs of soldiers and sailors who frequented tattoo shops in
62
large groups with limited leave time. “Sailors came in,” one
tattooer told me, “and you cranked them out as quickly as you
[could] because they’re all on leave. The financial impetus was

51. See U.S. Patent No. 464,801 (issued Dec. 8, 1891). Charlie Wagner patented improvements on O’Reilly’s device in 1904. See U.S. Patent No. 768,413
(issued Aug. 23, 1904).
52. Susan Benson, Inscriptions of the Self: Reflections on Tattooing and
Piercing in Contemporary Euro-America, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY 240 (Jane
Caplan ed., 2000); DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 50.
53. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 50.
54. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 234; R.I. Geare, Tattooing, SCI. AM., Sept.
12, 1903, at 190.
55. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 51; Rubin, supra note 19, at 234.
56. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 52–53; Govenar, supra note 50, at 217.
57. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 52; Govenar, supra note 50, at 218–19.
58. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 52.
59. Id.
60. Govenar, supra note 50, at 217.
61. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 59.
62. See DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 63–65.
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63

there to crank those [tattoos] out.” Soldiers and sailors during
the World Wars also bolstered the popularity of tattooing
among the general public and helped set trends in terms of tat64
too style, subject matter, and placement.
But in the post-war period, the popularity of tattoos began
to wane. Many soldiers returning from World War II realized
that their tattoos were not as enthusiastically accepted outside
65
of the military. And unsanitary conditions in many tattoo
66
shops raised serious public health concerns. Tattooers failed
to sterilize equipment, used the same needles on successive
67
customers; and drew ink from a shared container. After reported hepatitis outbreaks, many state and local governments
began to heavily regulate tattooing or ban it altogether, forcing
68
many tattooers either out of town or out of business.
Although tattooing continued, both in licensed shops and
unlicensed back rooms, garages, and basements, the post-war
period was a time of creative stagnation. Tattooers still relied
largely on the same collection of flash designs prominent at the
69
turn of the century. But this period of creative stagnation and
dwindling popularity set the stage for a fundamental shift in
70
the industry.
C. THE TATTOO RENAISSANCE
For more than a century, the U.S. tattoo industry was defined by flash. These simple, badge-like images offered
tattooers a source of popular, ready-made designs that could be
71
quickly and consistently applied to their customers. Flash met
the needs of tattooers, who considered themselves craftsmen or
tradesmen, with little interest in artistic expression for its own
72
sake. And it met the needs of clients, whose tattoos often

63. Interview with Subject 6, supra note 8, at 54.
64. DEMELLO, supra note 29, 63–65.
65. Id. at 66–67; Govenar, supra note 50, at 229.
66. See, e.g., DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 62.
67. Id. at 62.
68. Govenar, supra note 50, at 229–32. For more on the legal regulation of
the tattoo industry, see infra Part III.A.
69. See Govenar, supra note 50, at 217.
70. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 235–36.
71. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 196 n.4.
72. See CLINTON R. SANDERS, CUSTOMIZING THE BODY: THE ART AND
CULTURE OF TATTOOING 86 (2008); see also Rubin, supra note 19, at 233–35.
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communicated group membership or commemorated milestones
73
through established iconography.
But beginning in the 1960s, tattooers began to
74
reconceptualize their work. Norman Keith Collins, better
known as Sailor Jerry, was among the first and most important
75
tattooers to challenge prevailing practices. Influenced by Japanese tattoo traditions, he sought to elevate tattoo artistry in
the United States by creating elaborate, stylistically and thematically consistent tattoos that incorporated the entire human
76
body as a canvas. Tattoos tailored to a particular human form
in the Japanese tradition stood in stark contrast to the typical
American approach of unsystematically scattering small
77
standalone images across the body.
Over the next few decades, the innovations of Sailor Jerry
78
79
and protégés like Cliff Raven and Don Ed Hardy helped
bring about three interlinked shifts in the industry that led to
80
what some have called the tattoo renaissance. First, a new
generation of tattooers was drawn to the industry because of its
potential for artistic innovation and expression. Experienced
and trained fine artists, many with graduate-level education,
81
began to see tattooing as a viable and legitimate career path.
Second, the creative output of the tattoo industry changed as a
result of the influx of artistically inclined tattooers. New techniques and styles that drew on influences ranging from cubism
82
to graffiti began to emerge. Third, the client base of the industry underwent a transformation. As clients became more affluent, better educated, and more knowledgeable about tattoos
and art generally, they developed higher expectations of tech83
nical skill and originality.
73. “When you had gone five thousand miles at sea, you got a bluebird on
your chest. When you’d gone ten thousand, you got the second bird on the other side.” DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 64 (quoting Doc Webb).
74. Rubin, supra note 19, at 233–35.
75. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 73–74.
76. Rubin, supra note 19, at 236–37; see also DEMELLO, supra note 29, at
72–75.
77. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 233–35 (describing the “international folk
style” of tattooing that characterized the early U.S. tattoo industry).
78. Id. at 236–41.
79. Id. at 241–45.
80. Id. at 233–36.
81. Id. at 235; SANDERS, supra note 72, at 19.
82. See DALE RIO & EVA BIANCHINI, TATTOO 12 (2004).
83. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 235; see also DEMELLO, supra note 29, at
92.
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These three changes gave rise to the most important development in the industry from the perspective of creative
84
norms—custom tattooing. Rather than simply offer their clients a selection of flash from which to choose, tattooers increasingly created unique bespoke designs for individual clients, cus85
tomized for both their tastes and their bodies. Custom work
provided tattooers an opportunity to create new pieces of original art instead of re-inking old designs. To the older generation
of tattooers, who saw their work primarily in financial rather
than artistic terms, the choice to devote time and energy to custom designs was puzzling. As one tattooer described:
That’s how the old timers made their money, repeating stuff over and
over again. When the new school guys came around, when I came
around, and started doing original [one-of-a-kind] artwork on everybody, the old timers looked at me like “Dude, you are crazy. Why do
86
you want to do that? We’ve got plenty of designs that sell great.”

As a result of these changes, the tattoo industry today is
87
defined by two very different paradigms. The street shop fits
comfortably with the common public conception of a “tattoo par88
89
lor.” A garish neon sign flickers above the entrance. The
walls are papered with flash designs. Clients walk in off of the
street without appointments, select the image of their choice,
and are tattooed by whichever tattooer happens to be free at
90
the moment. Clients are often charged a pre-determined,
91
cash-only flat rate. Most simple flash designs can be tattooed
92
in well under an hour, sometimes as quickly as a few minutes.
Hundreds, likely thousands, of tattoo shops in the United
93
States fit this basic model.

84. See Enid Schildkrout, Inscribing the Body, 33 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOL319, 336 (2004) (“As more and more middle-class people were tattooed,
and as artists with formal art training in other media entered the profession
. . . custom work increasingly replaced flash . . . .”).
85. See id.
86. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 58.
87. See, e.g., INKIES TATTOO STUDIO, http://www.inkiestattoo.com (last
visited Nov. 2, 2013) (describing the tattoo shop as “high-end”).
88. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 8.
89. See, e.g., FINELINE, http://www.finelinetattoo.com (last visited Nov. 2,
2013).
90. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 81–82.
91. See, e.g., SANDERS, supra note 72, at 143.
92. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 6, supra note 8, at 54.
93. As of 2007, an estimated 15,000 tattoo shops operated in the United
States. See Chafkin, supra note 3.
OGY
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Less familiar to the public imagination is the high-end custom tattoo shop. Skull & Sword, a respected shop in San Fran94
cisco, is one example. Located on the second floor of nonde95
script building, the shop features minimal signage. Rather
than accept walk-ins, tattooers book appointments several
96
months in advance. Instead of flash hanging on the walls,
each tattooer’s portfolio of custom tattoos is available for view97
ing. Custom tattoo clients are charged an hourly rate for the
time spent applying the tattoo. At high-end shops, rates between $150 and $250 per hour are not uncommon—again, cash
98
only. A sizable custom tattoo can take many hours to complete, often requiring multiple appointments over the course of
99
months.
Most tattoo shops, and most tattooers, operate somewhere
along a spectrum between these two paradigms, providing a
combination of small, simple, pre-designed tattoos and more
100
elaborate custom work. Since most tattooers learn on the job
through an apprenticeship, they commonly start with simple
flash designs, developing the skills necessary for more complex
101
custom designs over time. And because they work in both milieus, many tattooers self-consciously play the roles of both creator and copyist, a duality that informs and complicates indus102
try norms surrounding creative production. Tattooers work in
a medium that has a long history of widely accepted copying of
103
a corpus of shared images and iconography. That tradition,
however, conflicts with the premium placed on originality as
custom tattooing developed.
94. SKULL & SWORD, http://www.theskullandsword.com (last visited Nov.
2, 2013).
95. Skull & Sword, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/businesses/
212287593-skull-sword-san-francisco-ca.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
96. SKULL & SWORD, supra note 94.
97. Id.
98. “Cash only” is perhaps the only truly universal rule in the tattoo industry. See, e.g., SANDERS, supra note 72, at 105, 143.
99. Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 154.
100. See, e.g., id. with Subject 12 at 130 (explaining the grey area between
tracing tattoos and creating new work).
101. As one tattooer explained, “When you are first starting off and learning to tattoo you don’t get to be picky. You don’t get to choose. Because you are
trying to learn, you have to practice.” Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8,
at 57.
102. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130 (explaining
that the tattooer had not been “doing anything [other prominent tattooers]
had not been doing for 20 years”).
103. See, e.g., DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 37, 53.
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II. LAW, NORMS & TATTOOS
A tattoo, like any other original work fixed in a tangible
medium, is protected by copyright law. And like the other public goods that copyright law protects, tattoos are susceptible to
104
unauthorized reproduction. Once a tattooer creates a design
and applies it to the skin of a client—particularly if an image of
the tattoo is published on the internet or in print—non-rivalry
105
and non-excludability lead to predictable results. Copying is a
106
topic of perennial concern within the tattoo industry. But
copyright lawsuits or other formal assertions of rights are exceedingly rare. Instead, tattooers have developed a set of informal norms to structure the creative process and relation107
ships within their industry. This Part, after addressing the
applicability of formal copyright protection, describes the key
norms that have emerged within the industry.
A. FORMAL LEGAL PROTECTION FOR TATTOOS
108

In the absence of some applicable exclusion or limitation,
copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed in
109
any tangible medium of expression . . . .” Originality requires
that a work is independently created rather than copied from
preexisting material, and that it reflect a modicum of creativi110
ty. Although the standard for originality is low, its evaluation
turns on both an objective analysis of the work and an exami111
nation of the process by which it was created.
The fixation requirement ensures that the work is embodied in a physical form “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated

104. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
105. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 (6th
ed. 2011).
106. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 6–7 (explaining
that copying is only acceptable within certain circumstances).
107. See, e.g., id. with Subject 12 at 130 (stating that tattooing is “not reinventing the wheel,” everything is based on copying).
108. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[T]he design of a useful article . . .
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to
the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”).
109. Id. § 102(a).
110. See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
111. Id. at 346–47.
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for a period of more than transitory duration.”
Fixation
serves two functions. It helps reduce problems of proof by in113
sisting on a durable record of the protected work. Fixation also helps ensure that works are preserved and disseminated for
114
the benefit of future generations.
In the case of a custom tattoo, the question of
copyrightability must be addressed with regard to two distinct
but related works. Tattooers occasionally ink an image free115
hand directly on a client’s skin. But more often, they create a
116
detailed line drawing of the tattoo design on paper. Once the
line drawing is prepared, the tattooer copies it to a stencil,
which when transferred to the client’s skin serves as a template
117
for tattooing the outline of the design.
Although the line drawing forms the basis for the tattoo, it
differs from the final product on the client’s skin in important
118
ways. A drawing on paper is a two-dimensional representation. Depending on the location of the tattoo, the client’s body
119
transforms that flat image to a three-dimensional work. Particularly for tattoos thoughtfully designed to take advantage of
the shape of the client’s body, the shift to three dimension can
120
dramatically alter the appearance of the tattoo. More generally, line drawings often lack the shading and color typically
121
added to the final tattoo. If the tattoo embodies creative expression not reflected in the line drawing, it is probably best
122
considered a derivative work in copyright terminology. But
where the tattooer simply transfers the line drawing to the
body without adding or altering its expression, the tattoo is
123
properly understood as a mere reproduction.

112. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
113. See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J.
683, 730–34 (2003).
114. See Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067,
1094–95 (2010).
115. Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 82.
116. See id. with Subject 9 at 82–83.
117. See id.
118. See id. with Subject 1 at 12.
119. Id. with Subject 8 at 71.
120. See id. with Subject 8 at 71–72.
121. Id. with Subject 7 at 64.
122. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
123. Id.

2013]

TATTOO NORMS

527

Line drawings fall squarely within the Copyright Act’s def124
inition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural” works. A pencil
or ink drawing on paper satisfies the fixation requirement. So
assuming the work is not merely a copy of a preexisting work
and reflects some amount of creativity, the line drawing is eligible for copyright protection. This result is neither surprising
nor controversial.
The same basic analysis would seem to hold for the tattoo
as applied to a human subject. To the extent the tattoo is independently created and satisfies the low bar for creativity, it is
125
original. And as your mother has no doubt warned you, tattoos are permanent. An indelible representation of a work easily meets the statute’s demand for a work “fixed in a tangible
126
medium of expression.” Tattoos then, like their pencil and
paper counterparts, appear to be appropriate subjects of copy127
right protection.
But a recent dispute over Mike Tyson’s facial tattoo gave
one commentator an opportunity to challenge this seemingly
128
straightforward result. In 2003, Victor Whitmill tattooed an
129
abstract image, inspired by Maori moko, on the face of former

124. See id. §§ 101, 102(a).
125. See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–47
(1991).
126. Id.
127. The existing literature on copyright in tattoos either assumes or concludes as much. See Matthew Beasley, Note, Who Owns Your Skin: Intellectual
Property Law and Norms Among Tattoo Artists, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1137
(2012); Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 97 (2002); David Cummings, Creative Expression and the Human Canvas: An Examination of Tattoos as a Copyrightable Art Form, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 279 (2013); Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and Copyright Infringement:
Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 313 (2006); Christine Lesicko, Tattoos as Visual Art: How Body Art Fits
into the Visual Artists Rights Act, 53 IDEA 39 (2013); Yolanda M. King, The
Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos, 92 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
128. See Declaration of David Nimmer at 18, Whitmill v. Warner Bros.
Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-00752 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011) [hereinafter Nimmer
Declaration] (“For copyright protection in tattoos to arise, Congress would
have to act anew, in the manner of its 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act
to afford protection to computer software and its 1990 amendment to the Copyright Act to afford protection to architectural works.”).
129. See generally Peter Gathercole, Contexts of Maori Moko, in MARKS OF
CIVILIZATION 171 (Arnold Rubin ed., 1988).
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heavyweight boxing champion Mike Tyson.
Tyson subsequently appeared in the Warner Brothers film The Hangover.
In that film’s sequel, the same tattoo design was reproduced on
the face of comedian Ed Helms as evidence of a night of drunk131
en decision-making. Whitmill, after seeing promotional materials for the film featuring his design, sued Warner Brothers to
132
enjoin the release of the film.
133
In an expert witness declaration, David Nimmer offered
a number of legal conclusions suggesting that Whitmill was not
134
entitled to copyright protection for Tyson’s tattoo. Despite affirming in his oft-cited copyright treatise that a tattoo could
“qualify as a work of graphic art, regardless of the medium in
135
which it is designed to be affixed” including “human flesh,”
Nimmer argued in his capacity as an expert that Tyson’s skin
did not qualify as a tangible medium of expression, comparing
136
it to a frosty window pane or wet sand as the tide approaches.
But those quintessential examples of transitory media are a far
137
cry from the lifelong fixation of a tattoo.
More plausibly, Nimmer pointed to the useful article limitation on pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works as a separate
138
basis for denying protection. The useful article doctrine precludes copyright protection for products whose purpose is utilitarian rather than expressive, largely eliminating copyright

130. Complaint at 2, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11-cv00752 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011).
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id. at 4–5. Whitmill’s copyright registration covers “artwork on [a] 3-D
object” presumably because he created the tattoo directly on Tyson’s face without first drawing the design on paper. See TRIBAL TATTOO, No.
VA0001767704, available at http://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v1=
1&ti=1,1&Search%5FArg=va0001767704&Search%5FCode=REGS&CNT=25&
PID=FRK-tCFkHI5cOIoxALv0Rr_iVMy&SEQ=20130918145100&SID=1.
133. Nimmer has updated and revised Nimmer on Copyright since 1985.
See David Nimmer, IRELL & MANELLA LLP, http://www.irell.com/professionals
-51.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
134. See generally Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128.
135. Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128, at 4 (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1][i] n.392 (1999)).
136. Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128, at 4; see also Ann Bartow, When
a Treatise Writer Tries to Reconfigure Copyright Law to Benefit a Client,
MADISONIAN.NET (May 25, 2011), http://madisonian.net/2011/05/25/when-a
-treatise-writer-tries-to-reconfigure-copyright-law-to-benefit-a-client
(noting
Nimmer’s reversal).
137. See Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128, at 9.
138. Id. at 7–11.
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139

protection for industrial design. Pictorial, graphic, or sculptural elements incorporated into a useful article are protectable
only to the extent they are physically or conceptually separable
140
from the underlying article. Mike Tyson’s face, as Nimmer
rightly noted, serves a primarily utilitarian, biological function.
But applying the standard test for separability, Tyson’s
141
tattoo is easily divorced from his skin as a conceptual matter.
Nimmer insisted, however, that “the only legally cognizable result is to apply the strict requirement of physical separabil142
ity.” Otherwise, he claimed the Copyright Act would “set to
naught the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of badges of
143
slavery.”
At the root of Nimmer’s startling equation of willing recipients of tattoos with slaves is a concern over certain remedies
144
available to a successful copyright plaintiff. As he noted, copyright protection could grant Whitmill control over Tyson’s
145
public displays of the tattoo as well as reproductions of it in
146
photographs or video. Nimmer worried that the derivative
work right could give Whitmill some say over other tattoos Ty147
son might choose to apply to his face. And in the unlikely
event the tattoo qualifies as a “work of recognized stature” under the Visual Artists Rights Act, Tyson could be prevented
148
from destroying or removing it.

139. Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested
Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983) (“Copyright law has reluctantly embraced a variety of works embodied in utilitarian
objects, while simultaneously purporting to exclude the general province of
industrial design.”).
140. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143
(2d Cir. 1987).
141. See id. at 1145 (“[W]here design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences, conceptual separatability exists.”); see also King, supra note 127.
142. Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128, at 11.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 5–6.
145. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2012) (granting the copyright holder the exclusive right to publicly display the work).
146. See id. § 106(1) (granting the copyright holder the exclusive right to
reproduce the work).
147. See id. § 106(2) (granting the copyright holder the exclusive right to
prepare derivatives based on the work).
148. See id. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (granting the author of a work of visual art the
right “to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature”).
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Although the court characterized Nimmer’s arguments as
149
“silly,” these potential consequences are indeed alarming.
Luckily, copyright law offers courts many tools aside from the
blunt instrument of protectability that they could, and almost
certainly would, use to avoid this parade of horribles. These in150
151
clude narrow readings of exclusive rights, fair use, first sale
152
153
and related exhaustion doctrines, implied license, and equi154
table discretion over injunctive relief. But there is another
reason of far more practical importance why Nimmer’s fears
were unwarranted: the scenarios he envisioned are fundamentally at odds with the established norms of the tattoo indus155
try.
Copyright suits between tattooers and their clients, or
156
suits between two tattooers, are virtually non-existent. Most
of the copyright litigation involving tattoos centers around tat157
too-inspired designs used on clothing or other merchandise.
149. See Joe Mullin, Tyson Tattoo Lawsuit: Studio’s Defenses Are ‘Silly,’
Says Judge, PAIDCONTENT (May 25, 2011), http://paidcontent.org/2011/05/25/
419-judge-shows-sympathy-for-plaintiffs-in-tyson-tattoo-case/. The parties
subsequently agreed to dismiss the suit under the terms of an undisclosed settlement. See David Kravets, Hangover Tattoo Infringement Lawsuit Settles,
WIRED, June 22, 2011, 2:15 PM, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/
tattoo-flap-settled.
150. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1879
(2007).
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
152. See id.; see also Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Copyright Exhaustion and the Personal Use Dilemma, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2067, 2107 (2012).
153. See infra Part II.E; see also Michael Grynberg, Property Is a Two-Way
Street: Personal Copyright Use and Implied Authorization, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 435, 454 (2010).
154. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 486, 505 (2001) (“It hardly
follows from [a finding of infringement] that an injunction . . . must issue.”);
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n.10 (1993) (describing
how the goals of copyright law are “not always best served by automatically
granting injunctive relief ” ); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (noting that issuing patent injunctions “in accordance
with the principles of equity” is “consistent with [the Court’s] treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act”).
155. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 3, supra note 8, at 40.
156. Whitmill, it should be stressed, did not bring a suit against his client.
Tyson prominently displayed his tattoo in the first Hangover and other subsequent paid public appearances, including his current one man show on
Broadway, without any objection from his tattooer. See Michael Wilson, For
Tyson, a ‘Vulnerable’ Performance Outside the Ring, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2012, at A20.
157. See Crispin v. Audigier, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(discussing that tattoo designs were used on apparel, jewelry, and other merchandise); Tattoo Art, Inc. v. Tat Int’l L.L.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d 645, 647 (E.D.
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Occasionally tattooers sue each other on non-copyright
158
grounds. And rarely, non-copyright litigation arises between
159
tattooers and their clients.
But not a single reported decision addresses a copyright
claim brought by a tattooer against a client or a fellow tattooer.
And the available record reveals only one such case even being
160
filed in the United States. In 2005, Portland tattooer Matthew Reed filed a complaint against his client, Rasheed Wal161
lace, a former player for the NBA’s Portland Trailblazers.
Reed tattooed a custom image of an Egyptian family on Wal162
lace’s arm, for which Wallace paid Reed $450. Six years later,
the advertising firm Wieden+Kennedy prominently featured
163
Wallace’s tattoo in an advertising campaign for Nike. Reed,
who had not authorized the use of the tattoo in the ad campaign, registered a copyright in his drawing of the design and
filed
an
infringement
complaint
against
Nike,
Wieden+Kennedy, and Wallace, which was eventually dis164
missed after a joint stipulation. Notably, although Reed’s client was named as a party, it was the prominent use of the tattoo in the ad campaign and not Wallace’s regular public
165
displays of it that triggered the suit.
Va. 2010) (noting flash designs licensed for use as airbrush stencils); S.T.R.
Indus. v. Palmer Indus., 1999 WL 258455 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1999) (explaining
that tattoo themed designs applied to pool cues).
158. See, e.g., Quidgeon v. Olsen, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42309, at *2–3
(C.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2011) (explaining a trademark dispute between competing
tattoo shops).
159. See, e.g., Minnifield v. Ashcraft, 903 So. 2d 818, 820 (Ala. Crim. App.
2004) (demonstrating the invasion of privacy claim against tattooer for publishing photo without permission).
160. See Complaint, Reed v. Nike Inc., No. 05-CV-198 BR (D. Or. Feb. 10,
2005).
161. Id. A similar dispute arose in the United Kingdom over the use of
footballer David Beckham’s tattoos in an ad campaign. See Noam Cohen, On
Tyson’s Face, It’s Art. On Film, A Legal Issue., N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2011, at
A1.
162. Complaint, Reed, supra note 160.
163. Id.
164. Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 05-CV198 BR (D. Or. Oct. 19, 2005).
165. For a detailed discussion of Reed, see Harkins, supra note 127. Recently, Rick Genest a heavily tattooed model with distinctive facial tattoos settled
a dispute with the producers of the television series American Horror Story
over alleged copyright and likeness rights. Matthew Belloni, Fox Settles ‘American Horror Story’ Legal Spat Over 'Zombie Boy' Tattoo (Exclusive),
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr
-esq/foxs-american-horror-story-zombie-379219.
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Nonetheless, simply by bringing suit, Reed operated out166
side of the accepted norms of the tattoo industry. None of the
tattooers I interviewed had registered copyrights in their custom designs or knew other tattooers who had, although most
167
were aware that they could. None had been involved in a
168
formal copyright dispute or knew other tattooers who had.
Most were dismissive of the notion of bringing a suit against a
169
client or another tattooer. As one interview subject colorfully
put it, a tattooer who sued another for copying would be “la170
beled kind of a wiener with thin skin.”
Tattooers were somewhat more sympathetic to leveraging
formal legal rights, as Whitmill did, to target unauthorized use
171
of their designs on apparel or other merchandise. But on the
whole, they were reluctant to endorse reliance on the judicial
172
system even under those circumstances. In part, this reluctance is an outgrowth of general misgivings about the legal sys173
tem. But as the rest of this Part demonstrates, it is largely an
expression of more specific norms governing the creative process and the tattooer-client relationship.
B. CLIENT AUTONOMY
Both during and after the design process, tattooers consist174
ently demonstrate a respect for client autonomy. To varying
degrees, client input helps shape the design of a custom tat175
too.
And once an image is created on the client’s skin,
tattooers uniformly acknowledge that control over that image,
176
with some limited exceptions, shifts to the client.
The design process typically begins with a consultation,
where the client presents the tattooer with a basic description
166. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 19; id. with Subject 3 at
40; id. with Subject 6 at 50, 55–56; id. with Subject 11 at 110–11.
167. See, e.g., id. with Subject 1 at 14.
168. See, e.g., id. with Subject 3 at 40; id. with Subject 7 at 64.
169. Id. with Subject 2 at 26; id. with Subject 6 at 50; id. with Subject 11 at
110–11.
170. Id. with Subject 2 at 26.
171. Id. with Subject 6 at 52–53, 55–56.
172. Id. with Subject 2 at 26; id. with Subject 6 at 50; id. with Subject 11 at
110–11.
173. See infra Part III.
174. Interview with Subject 11, supra note 8, at 111; id. with Subject 12 at
128.
175. Id. with Subject 6 at 48–49; id. with Subject 10 at 96.
176. Id. with Subject 12 at 128.
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of the imagery they envision for their tattoo. Those initial descriptions vary in their specificity: “sometimes the customers
bring a lot to the table with the design element. Other times
they have no feedback and they’re just really open178
minded . . . .”
Typically, the consultation is the beginning of an ongoing
179
conversation between tattooer and client. Because of their
greater familiarity with theories of design and composition, as
well as a clearer understanding of the limitations of the medium, tattooers frequently guide their clients toward choices that,
while true to the client’s original conception, are more likely to
180
translate well into tattoos. After settling on basic questions of
subject matter, style, and composition, the tattooer typically
requires the client to pay a small cash deposit before drawing
181
up the design. The deposit fee is then deducted from the
182
eventual hourly-rate price of the tattoo. As a result, tattooers
do not ultimately charge clients for their time and effort in cre183
ating a design.
Once the tattooer draws an initial design, clients typically
184
have an opportunity to request edits or revisions.
Most
185
tattooers expect to make such changes. As one interview subject explained, “I don’t even get the line drawing finished all
the way, so I don’t fall in love with it too much. Because once
you fall in love with it, you don’t want to make any changes.
And sometimes you can go in a direction that’s just not right
186
[for the client].” Even after the client and tattooer agree on
177. Id. with Subject 10 at 96; id. with Subject 11 at 108.
178. Id. with Subject 9 at 82.
179. Id. with Subject 11 at 108.
180. See id. with Subject 9 at 92; id. with Subject 11 at 108, 119.
181. Id. with Subject 2 at 19; id. with Subject 6 at 49; id. with Subject 7 at
57.
182. “In order for them to get that tattooed from me, I need to do the artwork. That’s part of the service. They’re putting down the deposit, and assuming they’re not having me make 50 million revisions, it will eventually come off
the price of the tattoo.” Id. with Subject 3 at 141.
183. See id. with Subject 6 at 49; id. with Subject 7 at 57; id. with Subject
13 at 141.
184. See id. with Subject 7 at 57; id. with Subject 9 at 81; id. with Subject
11 at 108; id. with Subject 12 at 125; id. with Subject 13 at 140.
185. See supra Interview Subjects accompanying note 184.
186. Id. with Subject 7 at 57. But a small minority of tattooers refuse to
make edits. “I never redraw stuff, which is a weird rule. I always assume that
if someone doesn’t like the way that I’ve drawn something that they just
shouldn’t get [the tattoo] from me.” Id. with Subject 3 at 28.
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the line drawing, other choices, such as color schemes, often in187
volve client input.
Because custom tattoos are both commissioned and collab188
orative, a copyright lawyer would be tempted to consider the
tattooer-client relationship through the lenses of works made
189
for hire and joint authorship. Although strands of both of
these approaches can be found in the thinking of tattooers, neither maps onto the norms of the tattoo industry particularly
well. In short, application of these doctrines would suggest that
tattooers are generally the sole copyright owners of the designs
they create. But that level of control would conflict with the
deeply engrained norm of client autonomy.
Custom tattoos are almost certainly not works made for
190
hire as defined by the Copyright Act. A work made for hire is
either: (1) a work created by an employee within the scope of
her employment, or (2) a specially commissioned work that falls
within one of nine enumerated categories and is subject to an
express written agreement designating the work as one made
191
for hire.
Under standard common law agency principles,
192
tattooers are not the employees of their clients. And although
custom tattoos are specially commissioned, they are not among
the enumerated statutory categories eligible for treatment as
193
works made for hire. In addition, signed agreements that

187. Id. with Subject 7 at 57–58; id. with Subject 12 at 125; id. with Subject 13 at 140.
188. E.g., id. with Subject 12 at 125 (explaining a woman that described
the tattoo that she wanted, but left it up to the tattooer to draw).
189. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (discussing works made for hire
and joint authorship).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. They may, however, be considered employees of the tattoo shop under
some circumstances. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 750–51 (1989) (“To determine whether a work is for hire under the Act, a
court first should ascertain, using principles of general common law of agency,
whether the work was prepared by an employee or an independent contractor.”). In one anomalous scenario, model Amina Munster registered the custom
design created for her by tattooer, Tim Kern, as a work made for hire, apparently under the misapprehension that Kern qualified as her employee. See
Amina Munster, Tattoos and Copyright, TATTOODLES (Mar. 31, 2006), http://
www.tattoodles.com/magazine/editorial/147.
193. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (identifying the categories of works eligible as specially commissioned works made for hire).
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contemplate copyright ownership are practically unheard of in
194
the tattoo industry.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the formal conclusions of copyright law do not dictate how tattooers conceptualize their own195
ership interests in their work. As one tattooer explained, “I
don’t feel necessarily a strong ownership over [my custom designs], because a lot of the time it’s not necessarily my original
idea. It’s stuff that I’m being commissioned for, so I see myself
196
as more of a paid artist to bring visions to life.”
Joint authorship likewise presents an imperfect fit between copyright doctrine and tattoo industry norms. A joint
work is one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or in197
terdependent parts of a unitary whole.” The highly collaborative tattoo design process is strongly suggestive of the requisite
intent. But the contributions of most clients are unlikely to
198
meet the threshold of authorship. According to most courts,
in order to be considered an author for joint work purposes, a
199
party’s contribution must be independently copyrightable.
Although each tattoo features a mix of contributions from
tattooer and client, clients typically contribute uncopyrightable
200
ideas, not protected expression.
Formal law would treat most custom tattoo designs as
201
works created by the tattooer alone. Nonetheless, the design
process is deeply, and understandably, sensitive to client pref202
erences.
Clients, after all, exercise the final choice over
194. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 12; id. with Subject
2 at 24–25; id. with Subject 5 at 46.
195. See id. with Subject 12 at 125.
196. Id.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
198. See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069–71 (7th Cir.
1994); see also Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the Copyright Act “requires each author to make an independently copyrightable contribution” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
199. See Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1069–71; see also Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at
1231.
200. “[The client’s] contribution is their idea . . . so pretty valuable stuff.
Sometimes they have next to nothing to offer, yet them just being willing and
an open vehicle and canvas for what I can provide them is a lot as well.” Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 3. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea
. . . .”).
201. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 22; id. with Subject
10 at 96.
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whether the design is ultimately transformed from a drawing
on paper to a tattoo on the body.
Once that transformation occurs, tattooers invariably express a commitment to the clients’ autonomy over their bodies
203
and the tattoos that have become an integral part of them.
Far from seeing them as slaves or “cattle,” tattooers recognize
204
the freedom and individuality of their clients. When asked
whether she had any right to control the display, reproduction,
or other use of a client’s tattoo, one tattooer offered the following response, which accurately captures both the substance and
fervor of the industry norm:
It’s not mine anymore. You own that, you own your body. I don’t own
that anymore. I own the image, because I have [the drawing] taped up
on my wall and I took a picture of it. That’s as far as my ownership
goes. [Claiming control over the client’s use of the tattoo is] ridiculous.
That goes against everything that tattooing is. A tattoo is like an affirmation that it is your body . . . that you own your own self, because
you’ll put whatever you want on your own body. For somebody else to
say, “Oh no, I own part of that. That’s my arm.” No, it’s not your fuck205
ing arm, it’s my fucking arm. Screw you.

Copyright law limits the author’s right to control a work
206
after a transfer of ownership of a copy of that work. The first
sale doctrine, which terminates the distribution right after a
lawful transfer of title in a copy, is the most familiar example of
207
copyright law’s exhaustion principle, but not the only one.
Section 109(c) of the Copyright Act, for example, provides that
the owner of a copy of work is entitled to display that work pub208
licly. As a result, when Mike Tyson walks down the street or
appears on Broadway, he runs no risk of infringement. But the
Copyright Act does not generally extend to the owner of a copy
any unique privilege to reproduce the work or create deriva209
tives based on it.
203. Id. with Subject 11 at 111; id. with Subject 12 at 128.
204. Nimmer Declaration, supra note 128, at 5 (“Copyright law thereby becomes the instrument to impose, almost literally, a badge of involuntary servitude, akin to the mark with which ranchers brand the cattle they own.”).
205. Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 128 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
206. See infra notes 207–09 and accompanying text.
207. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
208. Id. § 109(c).
209. But see id. § 117 (enabling owners of copies of computer programs to
creative derivative works and reproductions). The common law rule of copyright exhaustion also extends beyond the statutory limitations to embrace unauthorized reproductions and derivatives under limited circumstances. See
generally Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA
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Tattooers, in contrast, embrace a more robust set of ex210
haustion rights favoring their clients. In addition to public
displays of their tattoos, they acknowledge clients’ rights to reproduce images of their tattooed bodies, whether by uploading
images to their Facebook profiles, submitting photos for publication in tattoo magazines, or even reproducing a picture of the
211
tattoo for commercial purposes. As one tattooer recounted,
“I’ve had guys say, ‘I’m getting ready to put out a CD and I
want to put [a picture of my tattoo] on the CD cover.’ That’s
flattering. As far as I’m concerned, they own their arm. They
212
own that piece of work.”
Tattooers also recognize that clients are free to create new
213
works that incorporate or even destroy their original designs.
New designs frequently use the client’s existing tattoos as a
starting point for expansion, regardless of who did the original
214
work. And clients with poorly executed tattoos often ask more
skilled tattooers for a “coverup”—a new tattoo that entirely
215
conceals the existing one. None of the tattooers with whom I
spoke expressed any reservation about these widespread prac216
tices. Assuming these new tattoos would constitute derivative
works in the first place, tattoo industry norms would seem
more forgiving than formal copyright law, which places the creation of derivative works within the copyright holder’s discre217
tion.
But under prevailing industry norms, not all client uses
218
are acceptable. Tattooers distinguish between uses of the tattoo as applied to the body, which are universally accepted, and
uses of the tattoo design as a work disconnected from the body,
219
which are subject to greater skepticism. For example, one
tattooer told me:
L. REV. 889 (2011).
210. See Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 68 (stating that the individual receiving the tattoo commissioned the work, thus the tattooer does
not believe that he has “rights” over it).
211. Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 14–15; id. with Subject 5 at
45; id. with Subject 8 at 68; id. with Subject 10 at 98.
212. Id. with Subject 8 at 68.
213. See supra Interview Subjects accompanying note 211.
214. Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 69.
215. Id.; see also id. with Subject 6 at 54; id. with Subject 7 at 62–63.
216. E.g., id. with Subject 8 at 69.
217. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
218. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 21; id. with Subject 13
at 142.
219. See id. with Subject 2 at 21; id. with Subject 13 at 142.

538

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:511

If [a client] wanted to then take [the tattoo design] and give it to a
graphic artist and have him turn it into an image [for a commercial
use], then I’d have a problem with that, or at least I’d feel like I
should get some kind of compensation for it. But if it was just a photo
[of the tattoo] . . . even if it’s the centerpiece [of an advertisement], I’m
220
OK with that.

Although copyright litigation remains quite rare in the tattoo industry, disputes situated at the edge of the client autonomy norm may prove the most likely to spur formal enforce221
ment efforts. Tattooer Christopher Escobedo recently filed
suit against the developer of UFC Undisputed 3, a video game
featuring Escobedo’s client, mixed martial arts fighter Carlos
222
Condit. Escobedo alleged that the game infringed his copyright by including a digital representation of the lion tattoo he
223
created on Condit’s torso.
The developer’s use of the lion tattoo arguably transgressed the limits of the client autonomy norm because its use
while in connection with a digital representation of Condit, was
224
detached from the client’s body. However, Escobedo’s decision
225
to sue departs from the background norm against litigation.
In cases such as this one or the Hangover 2 dispute—where use
is made by a third party not subject to the substantive norms of
the tattoo community, the client is not named as a defendant,
and significant economic value is at stake—the general norm
disfavoring litigation may be particularly susceptible to ero226
sion.
Those rare cases aside, tattoo industry norms place a premium on establishing and maintaining the relationship be227
tween the tattooer and the client. As one interview subject
put it, “To get a great tattoo, it’s a full surrender into trust and
228
faith in the tattooer.” In part, that relationship of trust is fa-

220. Id. with Subject 13 at 142.
221. Complaint, Escobedo v. THQ, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02470 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16,
2012).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2–4.
224. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 21; id. with Subject 13
at 142.
225. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
226. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 15–16; id. with Subject
2 at 21; id. with Subject 3 at 31–32.
227. See id. with Subject 1 at 3; id. with Subject 11 at 108.
228. Id. with Subject 1 at 3.
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cilitated by the tattooer’s recognition of client autonomy. But
as the next section demonstrates, those obligations to the client
manifest themselves in other, ongoing ways.
C. REUSING CUSTOM DESIGNS
Tattooers are frequently asked to replicate their own cus230
tom designs on subsequent clients. After perusing a tattooer’s
portfolio, a new client—typically a tattoo novice—will identify a
custom design tattooed on an existing client and ask the
231
tattooer for the same tattoo. As a rule, tattooers refuse to ap232
ply one client’s custom tattoo to a second client. Those requests are most often met with the frank response, “No.
233
[That’s] someone else’s tattoo.”
The norm against reuse of custom designs is rooted in
three primary concerns: the tattooer’s own artistic interest in
234
variety, the original client’s expectation of a one-of-a-kind
235
tattoo, and an obligation to develop a design that more closely
236
suits the needs of the second client.
Most custom tattooers take pride in their ability to create
237
distinct tattoos for each of their clients. One tattooer told me
she “would never put a custom tattoo that [she] created for an
individual client on another client . . . . because . . . [she]
th[ought] it [would] compromise [her] integrity as a tattooer,
238
and just as an artist in general.” Another interview subject
explained the reluctance to reuse designs in simpler terms:
239
“[I]t’s no fun . . . .”
Aside from creative self-interest, tattooers expressed “empathy” or “respect” for and an “ethical duty” to clients who en-

229. See, e.g., id. with Subject 11 at 108 (explaining that tattooers take
suggestions from the client because ultimately it is his/her tattoo).
230. E.g., id. with Subject 6 at 49; id. with Subject 10 at 97; id. with Subject 12 at 126.
231. See supra Interview Subjects accompanying note 230.
232. See supra Interview Subject accompanying note 230.
233. Interview with Subject 6, supra note 8, at 49.
234. See id. with Subject 6 at 49 (“I just don’t want to. I’ve already done
that tattoo.”).
235. See id. with Subject 7 at 58 (explaining that an existing tattoo can be
used as inspiration).
236. Id. with Subject 2 at 19; id. with Subject 5 at 42–43.
237. See id. with Subject 1 at 5–6; id. with Subject 11 at 109.
238. Id. with Subject 11 at 109.
239. Id. with Subject 2 at 19.
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trust them to design and apply custom tattoos. Some see
241
their obligation in almost contractual terms. One tattooer
told me, “I designed that custom for that person with an understanding. The agreement I basically made with them was that
242
this design was for that person and that person alone.” But
243
these understandings are not acknowledged expressly.
Still other tattooers think of their duty as an outgrowth of
244
the collaborative design process. Reusing a custom tattoo is
wrong because the tattooer is not solely responsible for the design: “The unwritten law [against reusing custom designs] says
that this is a product of the relationship between [the tattooer]
245
and [the client].”
Tattooers take this norm against reuse seriously, refusing
to reapply the same design unless they receive explicit permission from the original client, as one anecdote illustrates:
I tattooed a rock star [with a custom design that incorporated his
daughter’s name]. And I had his wife come in and ask for the exact
same tattoo. “It’s my daughter too, I love the way you designed it.”
And I told her “you need to call him and ask him. If you call him and
he’s okay with it, then I’ll do it.” But because it’s a design we came up
246
with together, it was an agreement that we had.

This sense of obligation extends to the second client as
247
well. Since most first time clients are unfamiliar with the
process at custom tattoo shops—or even the distinction between street and custom shops—tattooers often find themselves
248
playing the role of educator. First time clients, familiar with
the flash-driven stereotype of a tattoo shop, are often unaware
249
that they can commission a customized design. Others lack
familiarity with design principles and vocabulary and feel ill
250
equipped to describe their ideas. Tattooers often treat re240. Id. with Subject 2 at 19; id. with Subject 11 at 109; id. with Subject 12
at 126.
241. Id. with Subject 13 at 141.
242. Id.
243. See id. with Subject 13 at 142 (explaining “’I can do something like
that. What are the elements that you really like about it?’”).
244. Id. with Subject 1 at 3.
245. Id.
246. Id. with Subject 7 at 64.
247. See id. with Subject 5 at 42–43 (stating that there is a general agreement that exact tracing of another tattoo is off limits).
248. See id. with Subject 6 at 48 (explaining to first timers that an exact
tracing cannot be done because it is someone else’s tattoo).
249. Id.
250. Id. with Subject 11 at 107.
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quests to repeat a custom design as a starting point for evaluat251
ing the client’s true interests. One tattooer’s response to such
requests offers an example of this approach:
I’ll tell them that’s somebody else’s tattoo. So we can be inspired by
their work. You’ve got to be inspired by something. And I’ll try to get
more specific. What is it that you like about it? [Is] [i]t the blue, do
you like the way it’s drop shadowed, is [it] the subject matter? What
is it in particular? So when you find that out, most people don’t want
252
to copy other people’s tattoos. They really don’t.
253

The custom design process can take many forms. Some
254
designs are primarily the work of the tattooer, others are
255
largely dictated by specific client input, and still others are
256
true collaborations. But regardless of the particulars of the
design process, tattooers agree that reusing a custom design on
257
another client contravenes industry norms.
Adherence to the norms respecting client autonomy and
disfavoring reuse of custom designs is widespread within the
258
tattoo industry.
These client-centered norms are noncontroversial in part because the behaviors they proscribe are
259
clearly defined. As discussed below, the broader norm against
copying the custom designs of other tattooers—though widespread—gives rise to more frequent disagreement because its
precise contours are far more open to interpretation.
D. COPYING CUSTOM DESIGNS
The norm against copying custom tattoo designs, while
widely shared among tattooers, is susceptible to a range of in260
terpretations. Although literal copying of another tattooer’s
261
custom design clearly violates the norm, tattooers vary considerably in their evaluation of more subtle forms of copying

251. Id. with Subject 7 at 58; id. with Subject 12 at 131.
252. Id. with Subject 7 at 58.
253. Id.with Subject 3 at 27–28.
254. Id.
255. Id. with Subject 6 at 48–49.
256. Id. with Subject 3 at 28; id. with Subject 5 at 45.
257. E.g., id. with Subject 2 at 19–20; id. with Subject 3 at 34.
258. See id. with Subject 11 at 111; id. with Subject 3 at 27–28; id. with
Subject at 12 at 128.
259. See supra Interview Subjects accompanying note 258.
260. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 5; id. with Subject 6 at
51.
261. See supra Interviews Subjects accompanying note 260.
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that borrow abstract rather than literal design elements.
These differing estimations of the line separating impermissible copying from permissible inspiration, transformation, and
263
evolution result in disputes between tattooers.
This section will explore approaches to non-literal copying
within the tattoo industry, the variety of informal enforcement
mechanisms employed by tattooers when norm violations occur,
and the assortment of perceived harms that motivate those responses.
1. Defining Copying
Every tattooer interviewed agreed that literal copying of
another tattooer’s custom design transgresses industry
264
norms. Literal copyists, considered “the lowest of the low”
265
266
among tattooers, are referred to as “tracers,” “biters,” and
267
“hacks” and closely associated with “scratchers,” a derogatory
268
term for tattooers with limited artistic and technical skill.
Likewise derided are tattooers who, while they may redraw or
refine elements of a design, closely reproduce the basic subject
269
matter, composition, and style of a custom tattoo.
A custom tattoo designed by Guen Douglas subsequently
copied by other tattooers provides examples of both literal and
270
close copying. Figure 1 below shows the original design

262. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 5; id. with Subject 6 at
51.
263. See, e.g., id. with Subject 3, at 40 (recounting a Facebook feud between
the subject and another tattooer).
264. See id. with Subject 2 at 19–20; id. with Subject 3 at 34.
265. Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130.
266. See id.
267. Id. with Subject 12 at 132.
268. SANDERS, supra note 72, at 34.
269. See Interview with Subject 11, supra note 8, at 112 (stating that a
tattooer that bluntly copied another design has no ethics).
270. Guen Douglas, How to Avoid Tattoo Plagiarism, TAM BLOG (Mar. 15,
2012),
http://tattooartistmagazineblog.com/2012/03/15/guen-douglas-how-to
-avoid-tattoo-plagiarism.
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Douglas tattooed on her client; Figure 2 depicts a literal copy
271
created by another tattooer.

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

As the images demonstrate, every element of the original custom tattoo was appropriated.
The subject matter, composition, outline, shading, color
choices, text, and even placement on the body were copied. Of
course, given the hand-fashioned nature of tattoos, not to mention variations in skin tone and body shape among clients, no
272
two tattoos are ever identical. But these two images repre273
sent the extreme of literal copying within the medium.

271. Id.
272. Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 71.
273. See Douglas, supra note 270 (discussing the difference between the
sharing of ideas amongst peers and the replicating of a previously commissioned art piece on a new client as-is).
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Although the tattoo depicted in Figure 3 offers some variations on the original custom design in terms of color and text,
most tattooers would recognize it as a close copy that violates
274
industry norms.

Fig. 3
These examples of literal or close copying present uncon275
troversial violations of industry norms. At the other end of
the spectrum, tattooers generally treat purely abstract ideas,
defined in terms of subject matter or style, as free for the tak276
ing. In one tattooer’s estimation, “Maybe it’s your idea, maybe it’s your client’s idea, but you just don’t have ownership over
that idea. It existed before your tattoo. So to say [for example],
274. See Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 61–62; id. with Subject
11 at 112; Douglas, supra note 270.
275. See Interview with Subject 2 supra note 8, at 19–20; id. with Subject 3
at 34.
276. See, e.g., id. with Subject 12, at 131.
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‘That’s my owl and hourglass,’ is just stupid.” Between these
two extremes, however, tattooers lack any widely accepted def278
inition of impermissible copying.
Interview subjects consistently referred to the wide swath
of borrowing, situated between literal tracing and drawing up279
on common themes or ideas, as a grey area. Whether a particular instance of borrowing runs counter to industry norms
hinges on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
the design of the tattoos at issue, rendering ex ante determina280
tions difficult. As one tattooer explained, “In that grey area,
there isn’t a line until someone draws it. But that’s always retroactive. The line is identified as being crossed after the fact.
281
You can’t identify it.”
Within this grey area, tattooers are sensitive to the risk of
282
treading too closely to another custom design. In response,
some adopt strategies to reduce the risk of running afoul of the
283
anti-copying norm. When faced with a client who asks for a
copy of a custom tattoo, they deconstruct—or in their words
“dissect[]” or “reverse engineer[]”—the design to isolate the particular elements that appeal to the client and create a new de284
sign.
Others try to insulate themselves from the potential influ285
ence, conscious or subconscious, of other tattoo designs. One
tattooer said that if a client brings in a photo of another tattoo
as a reference for a new design, “I don’t even want to look at
that. Don’t put that in the back of my head, I don’t want to see
277. Id.
278. See id. with Subject 12 at 130–31.
279. See id. with Subject 2 at 41 (arguing that it is impossible to distinguish “copying” from “not copying”).
280. See id. with Subject 6 at 51 (stating that if a tattooer is copying from a
photograph that is different than copying from another person’s tattoo).
281. Id. That description of the elusive line separating idea from expression
calls to mind Learned Hand’s apothegm. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,
45 F.2d 119, 121–22 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Nobody has ever been able to fix that
boundary [between idea and expression], and nobody ever can . . . . [W]hile we
are as aware as any one that the line, wherever [sic] it is drawn, will seem arbitrary, that is no excuse for not drawing it; it is a question such as courts
must answer in nearly all cases . . . [w]hatever may be the difficulties a priori.”).
282. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 41 (explaining that he
would not send his portfolio to anyone for fear that it would be copied).
283. See id. with Subject 6 at 50–51 (noting that some tattooers purposefully do not copy).
284. Id. with Subject 5 at 50; see also id. with Subject 4 at 42–43.
285. See id. with Subject 2 at 19.
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it.” Others studiously avoid looking at the work of other tattoos as a general rule to avoid undue influence. Otherwise,
“you’ll draw from [other custom designs] subconsciously, no
287
matter what.”
But most tattooers are not quite so troubled by the pro288
spect of non-literal borrowing. Many see some degree of copying as an unavoidable, and occasionally desirable, consequence
289
of the creative process. The tattoo industry is steeped in tradition. And while more recent crops of tattooers have distanced
themselves, on a technical level, from the primitive work of
290
generations past, they simultaneously demonstrate a certain
291
reverence for traditional tattoo aesthetics. Clients are like292
wise drawn to the rich iconography of tattoo history. Daggers,
ships, and roses—although drawn with more artistry—remain
293
staples within the contemporary tattoo industry.
Because of the constraints of their milieu, drawing from
the common pool of traditional design elements is often inevi294
table. “[T]attooing and the imagery within the industry, it’s
so homogenous and everything is so iconic. You can’t just stake
295
claim to something like that.” Or as another tattooer put it,
referring to the ornamental fish common in traditional Japa296
nese tattooing, “a koi is a koi is a koi.” In light of those constraints, tattooers recognize that claims of similarity between
custom designs must be tempered by the influence of stylistic
297
and subject-matter conventions.
286. Id.
287. Id. with Subject 12 at 136. This worry is similar to the theory of subconscious copying adopted by the court in Bright Tunes Music Corp. v.
Harrisongs Music Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
288. See Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130; see also id. with
Subject 11 at 113.
289. See id. with subject 11 at 113 (discussing the benefits of learning from
other tattooers).
290. See id. with Subject 6 at 53 (noting that tattooers have become more
advanced in their tattooing abilities compared to tattooers of the “tattoo renaissance”).
291. See id. with Subject 12 at 130 (discussing some of his inspirations).
292. See The Meaning of Old School Tattoos, TATTOO JOY (2012), http://
tattoojoy.com/meaning-old-school-tattoo.htm (discussing tattoo history).
293. See Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130.
294. See id. with Subject 11 at 113.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See id. with Subject 1 at 15 (discussing the difference between custom
designs by style versus custom design influenced by subject matter).
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The scènes à faire doctrine in copyright law is premised on
298
a similar insight. Courts have acknowledged that where two
works both contain elements common to a given setting or genre, “infringement cannot be based on those elements alone (or
principally) but instead on the elements that are not inevitable
299
in the genre in question.” Just as “drunks, prostitutes, vermin and derelict cars would appear in any realistic work about
300
the work of policemen in the South Bronx,” traditional American tattoos are likely to depict swallows, anchors, and roses
301
with bold outlines and bright colors. As Figure 4 illustrates,
such tattoos often share much in common even in the absence
of copying. To the extent a custom tattoo fits within the confines of a genre, tattooers see them as less susceptible to claims
302
of copying.

Fig. 4
The notion of a shared commons of established tattoo styles
and imagery helps explain some exceptions to the general norm
against copying. One interview subject told me:
If [the artist is] dead, you can copy it. If that person has been around
a long time and is highly respected and revered, and he was a trailblazer of a certain style, it just goes without saying that people are go303
ing to have to follow that in order to find their own way. . . .

As discussed below, these exceptions also reflect tattooers’
ideas about the kinds of harm the anti-copying norm is meant
298. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:24 (2013).
299. Id.
300. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986).
301. See Art Rivera, Old School Tattoos: History, Examples, Symbolism,
New Ways of Usage, DESIGN FLOAT BLOG (June 7, 2013) http://www
.designfloat.com/blog/2013/06/07/oldschool-tattoos/.
302. Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 3.
303. Id. with Subject 1 at 5.
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304

to protect against. However, it is also indicative of a recognition that copying is sometimes a necessary component of the
creative process.
The skepticism tattooers express about originality is not
305
limited to traditional tattoo imagery. Regardless of subject
matter or style, they see copying as integral to their creative
306
enterprise. In part, this attitude reflects the eagerness with
which tattooers have mined other cultures, media, and art
307
forms to satisfy client demands. As Ed Hardy, one of the early pioneers of contemporary tattooing, explained, “tattooing is
the great art of piracy. . . . Tattoo artists have always taken
images from anything available that customers might want to
308
have tattooed on them.”
Many tattooers embrace the role influence and inspiration
play in the creative process. Even for tattooers who create new
custom designs for each client, true originality is often more
myth than reality:
Everything we’re doing is copying. Everything I’ve ever done is copying. Everything I’ve done is inspired by somebody else. I’m not doing
anything new that [other tattooers] haven’t done 20 years ago. . . . I
don’t feel ashamed about it [sic] and I don’t feel bummed out on
309
that.

Others see copying as a form of creative dialog that should
310
not only be accepted but celebrated. One tattooer explained
that “[i]f someone takes something I’ve done and [he is] inspired by it, takes it, reworks it, and makes it even better[,]
[t]hat’s not going to make me upset. That’s going to make me
311
say, dude, I can step it up too.”
Tattooers agree that literal and close copying violate indus312
try norms. But outside of those easy cases, tattooers exhibit a
range of attitudes when their custom designs share common el313
ements. Some see any degree of conscious or subconscious
304. See infra Part II.D.3.
305. See Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130–31 (discussing
copying a new style or technique).
306. Id.
307. See Benson, supra note 52, at 242.
308. Id. at 243 (quoting Don Ed Hardy).
309. Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 130.
310. See id. with Subject 7 at 61.
311. Id.
312. Id. with Subject 5 at 43.
313. See id. with Subject 8 at 70 (discussing different reactions tattoo artists have).
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borrowing as something to be avoided, while others embrace
314
the influence of their peers. Not surprisingly, tattooers faced
315
adopt a range of stances when confronted with copying.
2. Detection & Enforcement
316

Custom tattoos are inherently private works. Aside from
the client’s social acquaintances and customers browsing the
tattooer’s portfolio, few people have occasion to view a custom
317
tattoo. Therefore, they have been less susceptible to copying
than the mass media products at the center of most copyright
litigation. For this reason, many tattooers were skeptical of the
rise of tattoo magazines in decades past because they posed an
318
increased risk of copying. But today, images of custom tattoos
319
are more accessible than ever. Tattooers and tattoo shops
post photos of their work on their websites; clients share photos
of their tattoos on social networks like Facebook; and
microblogging sites like Tumblr and Pinterest feature thousands of photos of custom tattoos, often without attribution to
320
either the tattooer or the client. This widespread availability
of custom tattoo images—combined with an influx of inexperienced tattooers and clients—has resulted in a marked increase
321
in literal and close copying within the tattoo industry.
The majority of tattooers shared at least one anecdote of
their custom tattoo designs being copied by another tattooer in
322
violation of the anti-copying norm. In most of these stories,
the internet played a role in enabling both access to the original
323
tattoo and detection of the copy. Tattooers often discover cop314. Compare id. with Subject 3 at 34 (“I don’t believe in homage at all.”),
with id. with Subject 8 at 70 (“I would feel flattered.”).
315. See id. with Subject 8 at 70.
316. See id. with Subject 7 at 62 (explaining that the tattoo will only be
seen on the tattooed person).
317. See id.
318. See DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 34–37.
319. See Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 83 (discussing accessibility of tattoos on the internet).
320. See, e.g., #tattoo, TUMBLR (Sept. 26, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://www
.tumblr.com/tagged/tattoos (illustrating numerous tattoos and tattooers at
work).
321. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 175–76 (explaining inexperienced
tattooers and copying).
322. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 88 (describing a
time when his tattoo of a lion ended up on TUMBLR on a girl that he never
tattooed).
323. See id.
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ies when clients, friends, or other tattooers recognize a copied
324
design and bring it to their attention. None of the tattooers
with whom I spoke have actively searched for copies of their
325
work.
Technology also plays a role in the various enforcement
326
mechanisms employed by tattooers. Face to face responses to
copying do sometimes occur if two tattooers happen to work in
the same city or encounter each other at one of the many tattoo
327
conventions across the country. But because of the national
and international scope of the tattoo industry, email, Facebook,
and tattoo-specific online discussion boards are increasingly the
328
loci of enforcement efforts.
When tattooers encounter what they consider copies of
their work, they typically adopt one of three basic strategies:
329
inaction, direct communication, or negative gossip.
Many
tattooers, typically those with more than a decade of experience, told me that, while they recognize that copying is inconsistent with the norms and expectations of the industry, they
have no interest in pursuing any recourse, formal or informal,
330
against copyists. One tattooer, after describing a scenario in
which a custom sleeve—a tattoo occupying the client’s entire
arm, from shoulder to wrist—was traced by another tattooer
explained, “[y]ou can’t control other people. If you try to live
your life controlling other people, good luck with that. It’s dis331
heartening, but you have to let that stuff go.”
332
Other tattooers communicate directly with copyists. These conversations range from the friendly to the overtly confron333
tational. Some veteran tattooers see instances of copying as
324. See id. with Subject 11 at 111 (noting that his friend relayed instances
of copying that were discovered at a tattoo convention).
325. Id.
326. See id. with Subject 12 at 132 (discussing an internet response to copying).
327. See id. with Subject 13 at 150 (describing an altercation at a convention).
328. See Beasley, supra note 127, at 1172–73 (describing how tattoo artists
use the internet to search for copying).
329. See id. at 1166–68.
330. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 60 (explaining that
tattooers do not “do anything” because “imitation is the highest form of flattery”).
331. Id.; see also Beasley, supra note 127, at 1168.
332. Beasley, supra note 127, at 1168.
333. See Interview with Subject 12, supra note 8, at 134 (describing a range
of reactions from playful teasing to intense anger).
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an opportunity to educate their less experienced colleagues.
One tattooer said he “might politely or tactfully offer some
guidance” to someone who copied his design, in hopes that the
335
copyist would change his behavior and grow as an artist. Another tattooer suggested that a common response to minor instances of copying is “teasing” or “calling each other out” in a
way that acknowledges the borrowing without any direct accu336
sation of wrongdoing. Less affably, other tattooers described
337
sending “[a] strongly worded email” to confront a copyist.
One subject reported a minor physical altercation between
two tattooers over allegations of copying, but physical violence
338
in the tattoo industry today is uncommon. Several interview
subjects, however, spoke of the very real threat of violence in
earlier eras of tattooing:
[T]here are nicer people who are tattooing now. That in turn makes
people less scared to rip somebody off, because they maybe haven’t
been in the tattoo world long enough to ever have that fear that
someone might break their hand or something, which people did when
339
I first started tattooing.

As tattooers with art school degrees replaced bikers and ex340
convicts, instances of physical violence, arson, and other extreme consequences of violating community norms disap341
peared.
Today, rather than grievous bodily harm, the primary con342
sequence tattooers face for copying is negative gossip.
Tattooers mention “public shaming,” “blacklist[ing],” and “shit
talking” as the most common means of responding to copy343
ists. Despite its size and geographic scope, many interview
subjects described the tattoo industry as a tight-knit communi334. See id. with Subject 1 at 15 (stating that rather than taking a copying
matter to court, tattooers will educate others on the taboos surrounding copying).
335. Id.
336. Id. with Subject 12 at 134.
337. Id. with Subject 2 at 22.
338. Id. at 23.
339. Id. with Subject 3 at 39.
340. See id. with Subject 11 at 122 (discussing a change in tattoo artists’
demographics).
341. See id. with Subject 7 at 62–63 (“In the old days there were definitely
consequences. You couldn’t set up shop. If you copied a flash instead of paying
for it, they’d break your hands, beat you up, burn your shop down, tell everyone I know that you are a rip off artist.”).
342. See Beasley, supra note 127, at 1167.
343. Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 22, 23; id. with Subject 7 at
62. See also Beasley, supra note 127, at 1167–68.
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344

ty. As a result, gossip can have serious social and professional
consequences: “[S]ocially, you’re screwed. In the community,
you’re screwed. . . . Being part of the community is a really
345
strong, important part of your growth . . . .”
This gossip spreads primarily among tattooers; clients are
rarely in a position to know that a tattooer has earned a repu346
tation for copying. So although they may feel a sense of social
isolation, copyists rarely experience any direct financial harm
347
as a result of negative gossip. But occasionally, tattooers will
348
make a more public stand against perceived copying. One
tattooer described her experience being publicly accused of copying in a widely read blog post:
I cried in my bed for like three weeks and didn’t leave. I was devastated. . . . [H]e said, “Boycott her tattooing. She doesn’t deserve to tattoo. She’s a hack tattooer.” I mean, those are strong statements. Then,
to go on his blog or whatever and see what [other] people wrote about
349
me. I’m a girl. I’m sensitive. I fucking cried for weeks.

Although several tattooers recounted instances of confrontation, negative gossip, public shaming, and the like, many took
a notably lax attitude toward the enforcement of industry
350
norms. Even when their own work was copied in a manner
that violated community norms, they did little to pursue the
351
copyist. This might suggest that tattoo industry norms are
inconsistently enforced, or perhaps that the attitudes and practices in the industry are merely behavioral regularities and not
norms at all. But for tattooers, like many other groups, norms
352
are often identity constitutive. Violating industry norms not
only runs the risk of community disapproval, it also under353
mines a tattooer’s self-conception. External enforcement ef344. See Interview with Subject 10, supra note 8, at 102 (noting that a
tattooer will be ostracized from the tattooer “circle” if he/she is found copying).
345. Id. with Subject 1 at 9.
346. See id. with Subject 2 at 23 (explaining that clients may not be aware,
but within the industry, artists get blacklisted).
347. See id. with Subject 13 at 150 (describing the success of artists known
for copying).
348. See id. with Subject 12 at 133.
349. Id.
350. See, e.g., id. with Subject 9 at 88 (discussing an instance when the
subject’s work was copied).
351. See id.
352. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (challenging widely held understandings of “rationality, choice, and freedom,” and arguing that behavior is a function of
norms).
353. See Interview with Subject 11, supra note 8, at 109 (discussing his “in-
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forts may be less important when, as here, community mem354
bers have internalized norms.
While most custom tattooers take seriously both community disapproval and harms to self-conception, the norm against
355
copying does not apply with the same force in street shops. In
many ways, the street shop stands as a holdover of the prerenaissance tattoo world. In terms of training, outlook, and socioeconomics, street shop tattooers often share more in common
with midcentury tattooers than contemporary custom
356
tattooers. Whereas the custom tattoo community emphasizes
artistry and originality, the street shop mentality focuses on
357
speed, efficiency, and client turnover.
These two environments inculcate very different sets of
358
values. Tattooers who learn their craft in a custom shop are
359
taught to avoid copying. One tattooer explained that the “one
moral thing [he] got out of [his apprenticeship], was that you
360
just don’t copy anybody’s work.” But a tattooer who started
out at a street shop was exposed to a different set of values:
[W]hen I first started tattooing I was at a street shop with real old
salty guys. They had absolutely no problem ripping people off, at all,
ruthlessly. To the point where I remember one of the guys that was
teaching me to tattoo being like, “Well, if they didn’t put it on the In361
ternet, they wouldn’t want it stolen.”

As a result, literal and close copying of custom designs are
362
more prevalent in street shops. Tattooers with artistic aspira363
tions are less likely to copy. “Anybody at a certain level isn’t
going to try to copy. Only the guys at the bottom rung are going
tegrity as a tattooer”).
354. Cooter’s claim that norms do not exist absent internalization is difficult to square with norm systems that appear to function primarily on the basis of external enforcement. See Cooter, supra note 11, at 1665. Nonetheless,
both norm internalization and external sanctions can reinforce one another.
See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 376–78, 381 (1997).
355. Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 145.
356. See generally DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 97–135 (describing class
and status distinctions within the tattoo community).
357. See Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 145 (“They’re just fucking banging shit out, it’s like, to get it done quick and efficiently.”).
358. See id.
359. See id. with Subject 10 at 97 (explaining that real artists of any medium do not copy or trace).
360. Id.
361. Id. with Subject 12 at 135.
362. See id. at 135–36.
363. See id. with Subject 7 at 60.
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to be willing to do that.” And tattooers who operate in the
street shop environment are less responsive to the threat of
365
negative gossip among custom tattooers. As one tattooer told
me, “usually those scratchers don’t give a hoot about the moral366
ity, or any sort of industry consequences.” But for those who
aspire to maintain or achieve a sense of belonging and recognition within the broader tattoo community, including many
tattooers currently working in street shops, the anti-copying
367
norm exerts significant influence.
3. The Harms of Copying
The variety of responses to violations of the anti-copying
norm reflects the assortment of perceived harms tattooers asso368
ciate with copying. Some regard copying as a compliment;
369
others are concerned that copying injures their clients. For
many tattooers, interests in attribution and artistic integrity
370
are at the root of the norm against copying custom designs.
But tattooers also talk about the financial harms of copying,
sometimes as a matter of competitive pricing, but more often in
371
terms of free riding. The harms tattooers articulate, in turn,
offer a window into the underlying explanations for both the
content of tattoo industry norms and the more fundamental
choice to forego formal legal enforcement.
Some tattooers subscribe to Charles Caleb Colton’s apho372
rism: “Imitation is the sincerest [form] of flattery.” They see
copies of their custom tattoos as recognition of the power and
373
appeal of their designs. But for most tattooers, copying in374
flicts some combination of financial and dignitary harm.
364. Id.
365. See id. with Subject 12 at 135 (describing her experience at a street
shop).
366. Id. with Subject 2 at 20.
367. See id. with Subject 12 at 135–36 (discussing her struggle to gain acceptance while working in a street shop).
368. Id. with Subject 8 at 70.
369. Id. with Subject 7 at 60.
370. See id. with Subject 11 at 114 (explaining that the greatest aspect of
being a tattooer is being creative).
371. See id. with Subject 12 at 130 (saying “[t]hat’s the biggest thing, it’s
just lazy”).
372. C. C. COLTON, LACON: OR, MANY THINGS IN FEW WORDS; ADDRESSED
TO THOSE WHO THINK 113 (London et al. eds., 1820).
373. See Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 88.
374. See id. with Subject 12 at 134 (discussing a tattoo artist’s reaction to
perceived copying).
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Many object to copying for the same reason they refuse to reuse
their own custom designs: clients have expectations of a
unique, personal tattoo. Tattooers describe custom designs as
imbued with “very personal sentiment,” an “express[ion of] . . .
375
individuality,” or even something “sacred.” As a result, when
a tattooer copies a custom design, it erodes the value of the client’s one-of-a-kind tattoo.
Tattooers see themselves as personally injured by copying
376
as well. When their designs are copied, they are denied some
measure of “notoriety,” “awareness,” or “respect” they would
377
have otherwise derived from a successful tattoo. In the words
of one tattooer, “I think the initial harm was somebody else getting credit for something that I created. So someone else [was]
378
receiving some sort of personal gain . . . socially.” This interest in attribution is also evident in the complaints tattooers vocalize when images of tattoos they created are posted on the internet without credit.
The financial impact of copying is at the fore for many
379
tattooers. Because they charge hourly rates, the amount of
cash in a tattooer’s pocket at the end of each day depends on
the number of clients booked and the complexity of the tattoos
380
executed. Worries over business lost to copyists, therefore,
381
can be felt acutely.
Many tattooers “are concerned about
[copying] because they think it’s money being taken out of their
mouth . . . because there’s a guy down the street now that
might be tattooing and doing the same kind of style for, say,
382
$20 less.” This risk of “underselling”—tattooing the same imagery at a lower price—explains why some tattooers take copy383
ing so seriously.

375. Id. with Subject 11 at 115; id. with Subject 7 at 62.
376. See id. with Subject 1 at 7 (explaining that copying is deeper than a
personal financial issue; copying goes against tradition).
377. Id.
378. Id. with Subject 11 at 114.
379. See id. with Subject 12 at 134 (discussing how the copyist will charge
significantly less than the original tattooer, compromising the original
tattooer’s profitability).
380. See id. with Subject 8 at 68 (discussing how payments by the hour
work practically).
381. Id. at 73.
382. Id.
383. Id. with Subject 12 at 134.
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Other tattooers, however, were dismissive of the notion of
384
First, unless two
direct financial harm from copying.
tattooers operate in the same city, they rarely compete for the
385
same clients. While some clients do travel to work with a pre386
ferred tattooer, most seek services close to home. Second, well
established tattooers, whose designs are most likely to be copied, are often booked with a full slate of appointments many
months in advance and therefore may not have the capacity to
387
serve the copyist’s client. But at least one tattooer rejected
this rationalization, explaining:
[People] view tattooers on these different tiers. They have these ideas
of big name people and, “This person’s OK to rip off . . . .” because
they assume that some guy’s booked a year ahead and it doesn’t affect
him . . . . [T]he people who ripped me off were . . . less accomplished
than me so they felt like that was justified. Like, “Oh, whatever, you
work at this great shop. You’re a big name guy.” I’m like, No, I’m not.
388
We probably pay the same amount of rent.

Despite disagreement over the magnitude of direct financial losses attributable to copying, the consensus among
tattooers is that creating original designs entails significant
389
opportunity costs. Tattooers talked about the “hard earned
time,” “struggle,” “effort,” and “guesswork” involved in design390
ing a custom tattoo.
By tracing the results of another
391
tattooer’s labor, the copyist is “just lazy.” In terms familiar to
copyright law, the tracer merely sought “to avoid the drudgery
392
in working up something fresh.” By free riding on the efforts
and opportunity costs of their peers, tracers inflict perceived
harms on other tattooers:
If it’s something that took me four hours to draw . . . they’re cutting
out all that drawing time by just tracing an image of it. They’re not
putting any effort, whereas I spent hard earned time that I wasn’t
hanging out with my boyfriend or walking the dog because I was up
393
all night working on this tattoo design that someone else copied.
384. See id. at 135.
385. See Beasley, supra note 127, at 1172.
386. See Interview with Subject 11, supra note 8, at 121 (discussing the
rarity of client’s willingness to travel).
387. Cf. id. with Subject 13 at 139 (discussing that the copyist adversely
affects the profit margins of the established tattooer).
388. Id. with Subject 3 at 34.
389. See id. with Subject 2 at 22 (explaining that much time and energy
goes into the creation of a new tattoo).
390. Id. with Subject 2 at 21–22.
391. Id. with Subject 12 at 130.
392. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
393. Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 21.
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Although opinions differ on the harms copying imposes, the
appropriate responses to those harms, and even the precise
contours of impermissible copying, tattooers regard literal or
close copying of custom tattoo designs as a clear violation of in394
dustry norms. In contrast, and as the next two sections discuss, tattooers agree that copying from other works of visual
395
art is a standard and accepted practice within the industry.
E. COPYING FLASH
Pre-designed flash images, in contrast to custom tattoos,
are copied freely within the tattoo industry, with the implicit
understanding that those who acquire a copy of a flash design
396
are entitled to reproduce it on as many clients as they choose.
However, the unstated rules surrounding flash impose some
397
important limits on its use as well.
For most of its history in the United States, flash served as
398
the lifeblood of the tattoo industry. Even after the dramatic
rise of custom tattooing in recent decades, flash continues to
399
play a major role in street shops. And more recently, the industry has witnessed a resurgence of traditional flash imagery
among the more discerning clientele typically associated with
400
higher end custom shops.
Historically, tattoo shops acquired their collections of flash
401
in a number of ways. Young tattooers and apprentices were
expected to draw new designs and contribute them to the
402
shop. As one tattooer recounted, “If you were the new up and
coming tattoo artist, you made flash that you gave to the owner
and it sat in the shop. ‘Here is [sic] some designs I drew that I
403
think everyone can do.’” Tattooers might also share flash designs with one another or copy them from their clients’ bod-

394. See id. at 22–23 (explaining that tattooists known for copying may be
banned from conventions and shops).
395. See, e.g., id. with Subject 12 at 137 (“Van Gogh can’t tattoo Starry
Night on you but I can.”).
396. Id. with Subject 2 at 24.
397. See id. with Subject 3 at 29 (“[T]here’s also an unspoken thing . . . that
you wouldn’t really do it the same.”).
398. See DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 52–53.
399. Id. at 92.
400. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 63–64.
401. See id. at 63.
402. Id.
403. Id.
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404

ies. Early on, tattooers like Lew Alberts recognized the potentially lucrative market in flash designs and began selling
sheets of tattoo designs to those not interested in or capable of
405
drawing their own. Many shops were eager to pay for these
images since the greater their stockpile of flash, the more ap406
pealing shops were to potential clients.
407
Tattooers still produce flash today. It is marketed and
sold on the internet, through tattoo supply catalogs, and at tat408
too conventions across the country. A typical sheet of flash, as
illustrated in Figure 5 below, contains five or six designs. A collection of five to ten unique sheets of flash designs sells today
409
from roughly $50 to $250. In addition to full-color renderings,
contemporary flash is often packaged with separate line drawings of each design to save tattooer the trouble of tracing out410
lines.

Fig. 5
404. DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 53.
405. Id. at 52.
406. See id. (stating that the early tattoo supply business was highly competitive).
407. Id. at 92.
408. Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 8.
409. Id.
410. Id. with Subject 6 at 50.
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When Lew Alberts began selling sheets of flash at the turn
of the twentieth century, he did not include an end user license
411
agreement to define the permitted uses of his designs. Contemporary designers and retailers of flash are similarly silent
on the question of precisely what rights are transferred when a
412
tattooer purchases flash. While this failure to clearly articulate the scope of the license accompanying flash would strike
professionals in many creative industries—and certainly their
lawyers—as a troubling oversight, tattooers express no hesita413
tion about what the purchase of flash entails.
414
They describe flash as meant “to be replicated.” In their
understanding, “if you purchase a set [of flash] . . . you now
have purchased rights to tattoo these images should someone
415
want them.” Purchasing flash entitles the tattooer to copy
416
that design on as many customers as choose it. Ownership of
flash also entitles the tattooer to make alterations to the original design by adding, subtracting, or substituting elements or
417
by altering the color palette. As one tattooer explained, “[y]ou
do whatever you want to do with it. You can tattoo that on any418
body however you want to do it.”
419
None of these rules are communicated in writing. In fact,
420
they are rarely even spoken. None of the tattooers I interviewed could recall a conversation during which the rules sur421
rounding flash were explained to them. Instead, those rules
are “sort of handed down and understood” through observation
422
of daily industry practice.
Copyright law would most likely consider the practices
423
surrounding flash as a matter of implied license. An implied
411. See DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 52 (stating that flash merely contained the original artist’s signature).
412. Interview with Subject 5, supra note 8, at 43.
413. Id. with Subject 2 at 24.
414. Id. with Subject 10 at 101.
415. Id. with Subject 2 at 24.
416. Id. with Subject 1 at 11.
417. See id. at 10.
418. Id.
419. Id. with Subject 2 at 24.
420. Id. with Subject 5 at 43.
421. E.g., id. with Subject 8 at 77 (“I was never really told that, but I think
that if you know that you’re walking into a tattoo shop and there are designs
on the wall, you know that’s what it’s for.”).
422. Id. with Subject 2 at 24.
423. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:131 (2013).
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license can arise when a work is created for and delivered to a
licensee for a specified use, such as when an architect draws
424
plans for a homeowner. More generally, a copyright owner
may grant a nonexclusive license through conduct “from which
[the] other [party] may properly infer that the owner consents
425
to [his] . . . use.” Given the long history of flash and the established expectations of both buyer and seller, a court would likely treat the sale of flash as strong evidence of the intent neces426
sary for an implied license.
427
But that license is limited in some notable respects. Buying flash means that a tattooer is free to copy the design for the
428
purposes of transferring it to a client’s skin. Copying it for
other purposes—for example, to print t-shirts or competing
sheets of flash bearing the design—would exceed the scope of
the implied license from a legal perspective and, more importantly, violate the industry norms surrounding flash: “If you
buy [flash] from a guy and when he leaves town you color copy
it and give it to everyone in town, he’s going to be pissed. ‘I sold
it to you. You’re the only one who can use it.’ You don’t do
429
that.”
The treatment of flash provides a useful foil to the norms
430
surrounding custom tattoo designs. More importantly, it offers a preview of the attitude toward other forms of visual art
among tattooers.
F. COPYING OTHER VISUAL ART
Unlike flash, which is created and marketed with the tattoo market in mind, works of fine and commercial art are not
sold to tattooers with the expectation that they will form the
431
basis of tattoos. Nonetheless, tattooers routinely copy works

424. Id.
425. De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241
(1927).
426. Cf. 2 PATRY, supra note 423, § 5:131 (finding that courts require a
“meeting of the minds”).
427. See Interview with Subject 10, supra note 8, at 101 (stating that a
tattooer can use a flash to tattoo, but cannot “take it to kinko’s and color copy
it and start selling it.”).
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. E.g., id.
431. Cf. id. with Subject 11 at 119–20 (describing the difference between
tattoos and other visual arts).
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432

of visual art. Although at first glance this attitude may seem
inconsistent with the strong norm against copying non-flash
tattoo designs, the distinctions tattooers draw between copying
within their industry and outside of it reveal a great deal about
433
their conception of the underlying wrong copying represents.
Every tattooer with whom I spoke had used a piece of fine
434
or commercial art as the basis for a tattoo. A few tattooers at
high-end custom shops no longer reproduce other works of visual art for clients, but most continue to tattoo such images on
435
occasion. Requests to tattoo paintings, photos, or illustrations
are so common that some tattooers described them as serving
436
the role traditional flash once played. Rather than choosing a
pre-designed image off of the tattoo shop wall, many clients today arrive at the shop with a pre-designed image located
437
through Google. Tattooers frequently steer clients toward a
custom design inspired by the reference material, whether to
satisfy their own artistic impulse or ensure a better quality re438
sult for the client. But if a client insists on simply copying a
439
reference, most tattooers will relent.
The reluctance to copy works of visual art has little to do
440
with any concern over the rights of the original artist. In
many ways, tattooers see any work other than a custom tattoo
in much the same way they see flash—a design intended to be
441
replicated, rather than created for a single use. Discussing
tattoos of cartoon characters, one tattooer told me, “Disney designs weren’t drawn for tattoos. [They are] icons . . . . Where as
custom tattoo design, that was drawn for that human being.
432. Id. with Subject 9 at 92.
433. See id. with Subject 7 at 62 (distinguishing between paintings or other
illustrations and tattoers’ work).
434. E.g., id. with Subject 7 at 61–62; see generally id. (containing all interview transcripts).
435. Compare id. with Subject 10 at 100 (explaining that only custom designs are available), with id. with Subject 7 at 67 (noting that both custom and
visual art reproductions are available).
436. Id. with Subject 3, supra note 8, at 28.
437. Interview with Subject 5, supra note 8, at 42.
438. E.g., id. with Subject 12 at 131 (explaining that tattooers do not want
to be shown an image off the internet).
439. See id. with Subject 5, at 43 (stating that when the tattooer is presented with a picture, he will agree to do something similar to it).
440. See id. with Subject 6 at 52 (focusing on distinction between mediums
as opposed to original artists rights).
441. See id. with Subject 11 at 120 (describing the acceptance that work
will be appropriated when you become an artist).
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442

It’s totally different.” Another tattooer used the same example to illustrate what he saw as the natural consequence of media saturation, explaining: “[T]his is something that is pounded
into our lives from an early age. Mickey Mouse. So how does society . . . expect us not to take these images and make them our
443
own . . . .”
Aside from the sense that commercial art images are fair
targets of reproduction, many tattooers are skeptical of the notion that turning a painting, photograph, or illustration into a
444
tattoo is merely an act of reproduction. Interview subjects
talked about the “interpretation” or “translation necessary in
445
order to make a painting a tattoo.” They stressed that such a
translation is “not a reproduction” or “just ripping off an image
and photocopying it or [using] some [other] mechanical
446
means.”
In copyright terminology, they see their work as
447
transformative.
Tattooers were consistent in emphasizing the difference
448
between human creation and mechanical reproduction. Because of the inescapably manual process of creating a tattoo, an
449
exact reproduction is impossible. And because of the medium
of fixation, even the most skilled tattooer cannot literally copy
another work of visual art:
I’m not a photocopier and this isn’t like painting on a wall where I can
go and get these exact pigments and it’s got a white background so it
doesn’t show up that way. It’s going to be seen through your skin, it’s
going to age. I’ll do my best. I just let them know I’m not a fucking
450
Xerox machine.

442. Id. with Subject 1 at 12.
443. Id. with Subject 6 at 51.
444. Id. with Subject 6 at 51; Id. at 52.
445. Id. with Subject 2 at 25.
446. Id. with Subject 6 at 51.
447. The fair use doctrine permits otherwise infringing use of a protected
work when the social benefit of a use outweighs the potential harm it presents
to the copyright holder. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (noting
that the fair use doctrine “permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster” (citation omitted)). The fair use analysis strongly favors uses of a work that “add something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message . . . .” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994).
448. E.g., Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 151.
449. See id.; id. with Subject 9 at 92.
450. Id. with Subject 13 at 151.
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Given these inherent characteristics of the process,
tattooers see themselves as adding something new even when
they set out to faithfully translate a piece of visual art into a
tattoo:
[T]he skill of tattooing is refining something into a tattooable image.
Tattoos are tattoos. Paintings are paintings. And you have to make
one into the other . . . . An oil painting looks good because it’s . . . layered and has a certain sheen to it. It will never look like that on skin.
But when you reinterpret it . . . it’s like developed a new meaning and
451
developed a new power behind it.

Whether a tattoo based on a piece of visual art would constitute a fair use under copyright law is a difficult question to
452
answer in the abstract. But the rationale tattooers provide
for this sort of copying is notable for how closely it echoes the
Supreme Court’s definition of transformation as “altering the
453
first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message.”
A distinct justification for copying mirrors another element
of the traditional fair use analysis. In the multifactor fair use
analysis, courts consider the impact of the defendant’s use on
454
the market for the original work. To the extent the new work
serves as a market substitute for the original, fair use is less
455
likely. Because of the specialized technical skill necessary to
execute even the simplest design, tattooers understand themselves as operating in completely different markets than paint456
ers, photographers, and illustrators. In other words, a tattoo
is simply not a market substitute for other forms of visual
457
art. When asked how she justified tattooing images created
by visual artists, one tattooer responded, “Because that person
is not a tattooer. They can’t do the tattoo for you. I can do the

451. Id. with Subject 9 at 92.
452. Cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (describing the tension between protecting copyrighted material and the necessity of “borrowing” in art).
453. Id.at 579.
454. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012) (listing the fourth factor in Fair Use
analysis as “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work”).
455. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that under the fourth factor, the court’s “concern is not whether the secondary use
suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or its potential
derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original
work” (citation omitted)).
456. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 62.
457. See id. (“[A painter] can’t tattoo anyways, and so his work is fair game
. . . .”).
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tattoo for you . . . . Van Gogh can’t tattoo Starry Might [sic] on
458
you but I can.”
Relatedly, some tattooers explain why the norm against
copying does not extend to visual artists in simple terms of
459
group identity. Those within the tattoo industry benefit from
460
its norms; those outside of it do not. Tattooers regard other
461
visual artists as a “completely separate community.”
Tattooers owe some obligation to each other, or at the very
least face consequences within their community for running
462
afoul of its norms. But since they see themselves as a countercultural group existing largely outside of the traditional art
world, tattooers are especially unlikely to extend the same
courtesies to artists they view as operating within the main463
stream. As one tattooer told me, “[W]hen it’s a painting or an
illustration, it’s not another tattooer’s work. So in that sense,
it’s not another pirate you may run across one day. It’s a
464
square, a regular artist.”
The near total absence of efforts by copyright holders to
target tattooers for reproducing works of visual art likely rein465
forces this norm. Tattooers reject the possibility that their
use of works of visual art could expose them to copyright liabil466
ity as remote. That assessment appears to be warranted. A
single unreported case, dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, addresses allegations that a tattoo infringes another copy467
righted work. There, the author of a short literary work entitled “Laundry Money” sued rapper Soulja Boy for his allegedly
458. Id. with Subject 12 at 137. Indeed, many tattooers argue that rather
than causing market harm, they are bringing valuable exposure and attention
to the original artist. They see tattoos as a “form of flattery” or “advertising.”
Id. with Subject 8 at 75. Some tattooers discussed the use of their own works
of fine art as the basis for tattoos. They were flattered, thought it was “cool,”
or at worst saw it as “not a big deal.” Id. with Subject 7 at 60; id. with Subject
9 at 89; id. with Subject 1 at 5.
459. See id. with Subject 11 at 120–21.
460. See id. at 121.
461. Id.
462. See id. with Subject 2 at 22 (describing the consequences of breaking
norms in the tattoo community).
463. See id. with Subject 12 at 138 (“[W]e don’t want to be part of mainstream society.”).
464. Id. with Subject 7 at 62.
465. See id. with Subject 3 at 41 (suggesting that tattoo artists would take
copying more seriously if they were sued).
466. See, e.g., id. with Subject 11 at 119.
467. Brown v. Way, No. 10-13016, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87362, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 5, 2011).
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468

infringing tattoo. Although none of my interview subjects had
heard of that case, several recounted a widespread story within
the industry concerning lawsuits reportedly filed by the Walt
Disney Company against George Reiger, the “Disney Tattoo
469
Guy.” Reiger, an avid Disney fan, has reportedly covered 87%
470
of his body in tattoos depicting various Disney characters.
Despite the common wisdom within the tattoo industry, however, Disney has neither sued nor threatened to sue Reiger for his
471
collection. This suggests that tattooers may, in fact, overestimate the practical risk of copyright liability.
Rights holders, particularly large ones like Disney, are
likely aware of the use of their works within the tattoo indus472
try. The absence of enforcement against tattooers and their
clients is therefore probably not the result of a mere lapse in
473
policing. Instead, it appears to be a deliberate choice to forego
474
enforcement efforts.
Identifying instances of infringement
poses practical difficulties, but rights holders have targeted
other small businesses that present similar practical hurdles to
475
enforcement.
But there are at least two reasons rights holders might
treat tattooers differently from other small businesses that engage in occasional infringement. First, tattoos are an expres-

468. Id.
469. Mark Eades, Disney Tattoo Guy: Removing Tattoos for Love, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Nov. 18, 2010, http://ocresort.ocregister.com/2010/11/18/disney
-tattoo-guy-removing-tattoos-for-love/61876/.
470. Interviews: The Disney Tattoo Guy, B3TA, http://www.b3ta.com/
interview/disney/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
471. Id. (“No comment from [Disney] it’s a catch 22 situation. They allow
me to have the tattoos, but won’t publically back me because they don’t want
anyone else [to] have similar tattoos”).
472. See id. In addition to copyright claims, rights holders would likely
bring claims for trademark infringement against tattooers. This Article will
not assess the merits of those claims other than to remind the reader that the
relevant standard is the likelihood of consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship of the allegedly infringing good or service.
473. See id.
474. See id. (noting that Disney gets “a lot of free advertising”).
475. Jennifer Delson, Got a License for the Pinata?, L.A. TIMES, June 19,
2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/19/local/me-pinata19 (noting infringement lawsuits filed by Disney against vendors of unlicensed piñatas);
Peter Elkind, Stop Copying That Mickey, or We’ll Shoot! Why You Can’t Have
Your Cartoon-Character Cake and Eat It Too, FORTUNE, Dec. 29, 1997, http://
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1997/12/29/235894/index
.htm (noting Disney’s efforts, usually in the form of cease-and-desist letters,
targeting bakeries selling unlicensed birthday cakes).
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sion of a deep commitment to the underlying work. A Harry
Potter birthday cake is the sign of a casual fan; a Harry Potter
477
tattoo is the mark of a lifelong devotee. The same is true of
the sports team and band logo tattoos that are a staple at many
street shops. Rights holders may be reluctant to discourage
such expressions of zealotry for fear of alienating those consumers who are presumably most likely to stand in line with
cash in hand to purchase sequels, spinoffs, and licensed mer478
chandise.
Second, although copyright holders have shown a willingness to license authorized apparel, birthday cakes, and even
479
piñatas, we have yet to see a line of Disney-licensed tattoo
480
flash designs. Given the negative associations tattoos still
conjure in many segments of society, the tattoo market is not
one we should expect many rights holders to enter in the near
481
future. And because rights holders have opted out of this
market, unlicensed tattoos give rise to no measurable economic
482
harm. With those two factors in mind, it is hardly surprising
that rights holders have ignored potential infringement in the
tattoo industry.
This policy of benign neglect, coupled with the refusal of
tattooers to avail themselves of legal process, means that copying within the tattoo industry is governed entirely by internal
483
industry norms. As this Part has described, those norms re476. See Interviews: The Disney Tattoo Guy, supra note 470.
477. See id.
478. Rights holders are not uniform in their response to potential infringement by dedicated fans, sometimes tolerating or even encouraging such
behavior and at other times suppressing it. See Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1869, 1887–91 (2009) (describing the competing strategies of rights holders in
response to fan creation).
479. See supra note 475 and accompanying text.
480. See Interviews: The Disney Tattoo Guy, supra note 470.
481. Cf. People With Tattoos Are Perceived to be Less Credible than Those
Without, EXAMINER, Sept. 11, 2010, http://www.examiner.com/article.people
-with-tattoos-are-perceived-to-be-less-credible-than-those-without (summarizing research on perceptions of people with tattoos). For similar reasons, the
use of works of visual art as templates for tattoos can lay a strong claim to fair
use under the fourth factor. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 592 (1994) (limiting derivative markets to those the copyright owner
“would in general develop or license others to develop”).
482. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569 (focusing on the market of the rights holder).
483. E.g., Interview with Subject 5, supra note 8, at 43 (explaining that
everyone “that gives a shit” shares the industry’s understanding).
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spect client autonomy in the creation and use of tattoos, discourage duplication of custom tattoo designs by both the original tattooer and copyists, and generally treat flash designs and
works of visual art as freely available raw material for tattoos.
The next Part moves from describing these norms to explaining
them.
III. EXPLAINING TATTOO NORMS
This Part begins by addressing two related questions.
First, why have tattooers developed the particular set of informal norms described above? Second, and more fundamentally,
why did they develop any system of norms rather than rely on
the existing formal structure of copyright law? No single narrative fully explains these developments. Instead, the best explanation attributes the emergence of tattoo industry norms to the
484
confluence of complementary cultural and economic forces. As
a community, tattooers share a deep skepticism of the legal
485
system. And as an informal guild, tattooers share a collective
economic interest in both preserving market demand for their
486
services and restraining entry by new competitors.
Remarkably, the contours of formal law appear to play no
appreciable role in the development of IP norms in the tattoo
487
industry. In their study of French chefs, Fauchart & von
Hippel conclude that “inadequate or unsatisfactory” existing intellectual property protections are among the key “conditions
488
favorable to norm-based IP systems.” Studies of other creative communities have likewise ascribed some causal weight to
489
the unavailability of meaningful formal legal protection.
484. See generally id. with all Subjects (providing insight into tattoo artist
culture).
485. See id. with Subject 1 at 15–16 (stating that using the legal system
would be too costly, but also would be an “overdone” remedy for such “a small
scale thing”).
486. Cf. Workers in the Informal Economy, WORLD BANK, http://web
.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/
EXTLM/0,,contentMDK:20224904~menuPK:584866~pagePK:148956~piPK:
216618~theSitePK:390615,00.html#papers (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (describing the importance of market pressures in less regulated areas).
487. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 3, supra note 8, at 40 (having never
registered a tattoo image created).
488. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 12, at 199.
489. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1789–90 (“The absence of
lawsuits [between rival comedians] is not terribly surprising . . . . [C]opyright
law does not provide comedians with a cost effective way of protecting the essence of their creativity.”); see also Loshin, supra note 12, at 130–34 (describ-
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But tattooers are not motivated to create, maintain, and
enforce norms because of substantive barriers to legal protec490
tion. As discussed above, tattoo designs, whether fixed on pa491
per or on human skin, are works embraced by copyright. And
while some tattoo industry norms—most notably, those dealing
with what copyright lawyers would call questions of initial
ownership—materially differ from the outcomes dictated by
formal law, there is no evidence to suggest any appreciation
within the tattoo community of the finer points of the works492
made-for—hire or joint-authorship doctrines.
Tattooers do
not rely on norms as a second-best alternative to a legal system
that denies them protection or leads to substantive outcomes
493
that they reject. As discussed below, tattooers express skepticism about the legal system, but their attitude toward law is
best described as indifferent as a matter of day-to-day prac494
tice.
This relationship between formal law and tattoo industry
norms provides some confirmation of the dynamics within the
495
roller derby subculture described by Fagundes. There, despite
the availability of trademark protection, athletes developed an
elaborate set of rules and procedures for claiming pseudo496
nyms. Although Fagundes attributes the emergence of those
naming norms to the community’s emphasis on group identity
and volunteerism, tattoo industry norms help to confirm a more
497
generalizable principle.
Aside from doctrinal hurdles to protection, practical barriers to effective enforcement could influence reliance on norms.
Chief among those barriers is cost. Although obtaining copy498
right protection involves little or no cost, enforcement is an
ing the inadequacy of copyright, patent, and trade secret doctrines from the
perspective of magicians).
490. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 12 (stating that tattoos
are different from something you would copyright or patent).
491. See supra Part I.A.
492. The evidence suggests the opposite. See Munster, supra note 192.
493. See Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 14–15.
494. See id.
495. See Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1097.
496. Id. at 1115–21.
497. Id. at 1140–43.
498. Copyright protection subsists from the moment an original work is
fixed. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). Registration, though a statutory prerequisite
for filing suit, is not required to establish a copyright interest. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 408, 504 (2012). The online registration fee for a basic claim in an original
work begins at thirty-five dollars. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www
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499

expensive proposition. A few tattooers mentioned the cost of
legal enforcement as one reason among many they would avoid
judicial process. One suggested that it would require “George
Lucas money” to “go around suing everybody and have a fleet of
500
people online 24/7 looking for copyright infringement.” The
market value of any particular work is unlikely to justify such
501
expenses. But the same is true for most non-institutional
502
copyright owners. Painters, photographers, and poets all face
similar economic obstacles to enforcement of their statutory
rights, and yet we do not generally consider them to be operating outside of the basic framework of copyright law as a re503
sult.
Indeed copyright law anticipates the risk of
underenforcement by allowing recovery of statutory awards far
504
in excess of actual damages and attorney’s fees.
Rather than substantive or practical, the most important
barrier to legal enforcement within the tattoo industry is cultural.
A. TATTOO CULTURE
Most tattooers expressed some degree of skepticism about
the law, the judicial system, or the notion of leveraging that
505
system to assert their rights. Misgivings about litigation are
not uncommon in society at large, but there are at least two
.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
499. The average cost of copyright litigation ranges from $216,000 to proceed through discovery when less than one million dollars is in controversy to
two million dollars to proceed though trial when more than twenty-five million
dollars is at stake. Steven M. Auvil & David A. Divine, Report of the Economic
Survey, AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, July, 2011, at 31.
500. Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 149; see also Beasley, supra note 127, at 1158.
501. Cf. Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 15 (claiming that legal
action would not be affordable given the little money being made from a particular design).
502. In theory, the notice and takedown provisions introduced by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act drastically reduced enforcements costs for authors whose works are reproduced online. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
503. Of course, some of these creative communities may well have displaced formal law through their own sets of norms. The absence of any informed sense of how creators within these fields operate reveals the degree to
which IP law rests on assumptions about creative production instead of a
foundation of empirical evidence.
504. See 17 U.S.C. § 504.
505. Other studies of creative communities governed by norms have noted
similar antipathy toward the law. See Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1137 (describing the relationship between roller derby names and national and international trademark regulations).
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reasons to suspect that tattooers as a group are more inclined
toward skepticism of the legal process. First, tattooers embrace
and celebrate their status as outsiders who operate without re506
gard to established social conventions. Second, tattooers and
their industry have endured a history of targeted enforcement
of regulations that effectively prohibited their trade in neigh507
borhoods, cities, and entire states.
Tattooers describe contemporary American culture as gen508
erally “too litigious” and “lawsuit happy.” And they express
distrust in the ability of the judicial system to arrive at fair
outcomes. “[T]he results of the legal system,” one interview subject told me, “have little to do with what’s right or wrong. I
509
think anyone with half a brain can see that.”
Some tattooers are particularly dismissive of what they see
as the rise of intellectual property lawsuits in recent years. One
tattooer told me such disputes are “really silly. It[’s] basically
just a society on it’s [sic] way down and we’re tur[n]ing on each
510
other and suing each other. It’s petty, and it’s bullshit.” Within the tattoo industry, hiring a lawyer or filing a lawsuit to assert intellectual property rights suggests an “inflated ego” or
511
confirms your status as a “prima donna” or simply “a dick.”
Because of the outsider mentality many tattooers share,
512
they appear to be predisposed to skepticism about the law.
They talk about tattooing existing on the periphery of “respectable society” and operating within a framework that does not
513
“conform to normalcy.” Despite the recent popularity of tattoos, the act of covering the majority of one’s body with tattoos
514
remains a conscious rejection of prevailing social conventions.

506. Interview with Subject 11, supra note 8, at 122.
507. See, e.g., Govenar, supra note 50, at 228–29 (discussing age regulations imposed on the tattoo industry as a result of health and sanitation concerns).
508. Interview with Subject 10, supra note 8, at 98; id. with Subject 13 at
143.
509. Id. with Subject 6 at 55.
510. Id. at 50.
511. Id. with Subject 8 at 79; id. with Subject 12 at 138; id. with Subject 13
at 143.
512. Id. with Subject 11 at 122.
513. Id.
514. But cf. Brendan O’Neill, Tattoos Were Once a Sign of Rebellion—Now
They Are Evidence of Craven Conformity to Cultural Norms, THE TELEGRAPH,
Aug. 9, 2012, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/brendanoneill2/100175760/
tattoos-were-once-a-sign-of-rebellion-now-they-are-evidence-of-an-individuals
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Regardless of whether tattooing breeds this outsider attitude or
it results instead from self-selection, tattooers see themselves
as standing apart from mainstream society, even as their work
gains a foothold in it. As one tattooer described his compatriots,
“We’re pirates. This is a fringe art form, no matter what they
want to say. It’s not a regular square job. It’s not a normal way
515
to make a living.” Their position at the margins is tied to a
sense of detachment from established mechanisms of social
control, which in turn reinforces a preference for selfgovernance. One tattooer’s response to a hypothetical peer who
turned to formal law to resolve a dispute over copying sums up
this attitude: “We govern ourselves. . . . So step off your high
516
horse and un-hire your lawyer.”
In addition to its countercultural spirit of independence,
the tattoo industry rejects formal law out of a shared sense of
517
history. Although the biker and ex-convict contingent of the
tattoo community has been largely displaced by generations of
tattooers with clean criminal records, many within the industry
continue to see the legal system as a threatening presence:
“[C]oming from the time I started, there [were] a lot of people
engaged in a lot of illegal activities. . . . [A] lot of people [in the
tattoo industry] are always going to have a problem with any
518
kind of law enforcement or authority like that.” Even for
tattooers whose run-ins with the law are limited to the occasional parking ticket, the history of regulation and criminalization of the tattoo industry colors their perception of the legal
519
system.
Public health concerns over unsanitary conditions in many
tattoo shops provided the original impetus for laws regulating
the industry in the mid-twentieth century. In the 1940s, state
and local authorities began to impose minimum age requirements on tattooing and more carefully monitor sanitary condi520
tions. After the 1959 death of a recently tattooed client from
-craven-conformity-to-cultural-norms/ (arguing that getting tattoos is no longer a rejection of social norms).
515. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 64.
516. Id. with Subject 12 at 138.
517. See, e.g., id. with Subject 8 at 79 (describing why many tattooers have
a problem trusting law enforcement).
518. Id. with Subject 8 at 79.
519. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 94–95 (observing that tattooers are
suspicious of the legal system as a result of harassment by local lawmakers
and law enforcement officials).
520. Govenar, supra note 50, at 228–29.
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521

hepatitis,
New York City, Nassau, and Suffolk counties
522
banned tattooing altogether. Criminal bans by state and local
governments across the country followed, including cities in
Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
523
Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Virginia. While
some of these early bans may have been a justifiable response
to a threat to public health, the tattoo industry long ago
demonstrated its ability to ensure a safe, hygienic environment
524
for clients. Nonetheless, tattooing remained illegal in New
525
York City until 1997 and was not legalized in South Carolina
526
and Oklahoma until 2004 and 2006 respectively.
Even in the absence of statewide prohibitions, tattooers are
still subject to local bans and restrictive zoning ordinances that
527
place tattoo shops on par with strip clubs and pawn shops.
South Carolina, for example, requires proof that a local zoning
ordinance explicitly identifies tattoo shops as a permitted use
528
before its health department will issue the required license.
Tattooers have challenged various state and local re529
strictions on constitutional grounds with mixed success. One
of the first courts to hear such a challenge described “the decoration, so called, of the human body by tattoo designs” as “a
barbaric survival, often associated with a morbid or abnormal
personality” and noted “one-third of the admissions to the U. S.
521. In the early 1940s, tattooer Harry Lawson unsuccessfully sought to
prevent such outbreaks by advocating for regulating hygiene in tattoo shops.
Id. at 226.
522. Id. at 232; Thomas J. Lueck, On the Tattoo Map, It’s the Sticks: New
York Plays Catch-Up at First Skin Art Convention, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1998,
at B1.
523. Govenar, supra note 50, at 232.
524. See Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (D. Minn. 1980) (describing sterilization procedures used by tattooers).
525. Lueck, supra note 522.
526. Governor Set to Ink Bill Legalizing Tattoo Trade in Oklahoma, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER. (May 6, 2006), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
governor-set-to-ink-bill-legalizing-tattoo-trade-in-oklahoma.
527. See Gary Nelson, State High Court Hears Mesa Tattoo Zoning Case,
USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 2012, http://www.usatoday30.usatoday..com/USCP/PNI/
Valley%20&%20State/2012-03-28-PNI0328met-tattoocasePNIBrd_ST_U.htm;
Adam Townsend, Tattoo Parlors Slated for Prohibition in Downtown S.C., SAN
CLEMENTE PATCH (May 20, 2011), http://sanclemente.patch.com/groups/
business-new/s/p/tattoo-parlors-slated-for-prohibition-in-downtown-sc.
528. See Zoning Requirements for Tattoo Facilities, S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& ENVTL. CONTROL, http://www.scdhec.gov/health/licen/hltattoozoning.pdf
(last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
529. Yurkew v. Sinclair, 496 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980); Grossman v.
Baumgartner, 17 N.Y.2d 345 (1966).
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Public Health Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky, for drug addiction were tattooed. If the addict was also a sexual deviant, the
530
incidence of tattooing was markedly higher.”
Courts considering First Amendment challenges to re531
strictions on tattooing have taken one of three approaches.
Most courts have held that tattooing is neither speech nor expressive conduct and thus not entitled to First Amendment
532
protection.
Others treat tattooing as conduct rather than
pure speech but acknowledge that it is imbued with expressive
533
purpose and therefore subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit struck down a ban on tattoo
shops in Hermosa Beach, holding that “tattooing is purely ex534
pressive activity rather than conduct expressive of an idea.”
Like the processes of writing, painting, or playing an instrument, the court recognized that “the entire purpose of tattooing
is to produce the tattoo,” an expressive work squarely within
535
the protections of the First Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision, while marking a notable de536
parture from prior judicial attitudes toward tattooing, still
reflected hints of the hostility that marred earlier opinions. In a
530. Grossman v. Baumgartner, 254 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338, 338 n.1 (App. Div.
1964), aff’d, 17 N.E.2d 345 (1966) (holding that a New York City Health Code
provision banning tattooing except when performed by a licensed physician
was a constitutional exercise of police power).
531. See Ryan J. Walsh, Painting on a Canvas of Skin: Tattooing and the
First Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1063, 1075–82 (2011) (describing the various approaches courts have adopted to analyzing tattooing under the First
Amendment).
532. See, e.g., Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp.
2d 656, 659–60 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding that “the act of tattooing is not constitutionally-protected free speech” because it is conduct that lacks an “intent to
convey a particularized message”); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248,
1253 (D. Minn. 1980) (“Wherever the amorphous line of demarcation exists
between protected and unprotected conduct for First Amendment purposes,
the Court is convinced that tattooing falls on the unprotected side of the
line.”); State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 423 (2002) (“Unlike burning the flag,
the process of injecting dye to create the tattoo is not sufficiently communicative to warrant protections and outweigh the risks to public safety.”).
533. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Meuse, No. 9877CR2644, 1999 WL
1203793, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 29, 1999).
534. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir.
2010); see also Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 869 (Ariz. 2012) (adopting the rule from Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach and holding that tattooing is protected by the First Amendment).
535. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062.
536. In rejecting the separation between an expressive work and the process that created it, the court favorably compared tattoos to both the Declaration of Independence and the Sistine Chapel. Id.
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begrudging concurrence Judge Noonan conceded that the court
was “bound to protect the First Amendment value at issue” but
insisted that it was “not bound to recognize any special aesthet537
ic, literary, or political value in the tattooist’s toil and trade.”
Tattooers have been subject to unforgiving and frequently
unconstitutional regulations of both their profession and their
538
speech for more than sixty years. In light of this history, their
reluctance to turn to the judicial system to vindicate their in539
terests in their expressive works is understandable.
But
tattooers are troubled by the notion of inviting judicial scrutiny
540
for another reason. They worry that the introduction of formal law into the tattoo industry will open the door to a range of
541
unintended consequences. As one tattooer explained:
If you want to [pursue legal action], that’s fine. But I don’t want to
hear any pissing and moaning when you have to fill out contracts for
every fucking person you tattoo. Stuff like that, there’s going to be a
ripple effect from it. It’s just getting the government more involved—
or any legal body more involved—in something that we’ve had a lot of
542
freedom with and everyone’s enjoyed.

Aside from the costs of formalizing the tattooer-client relationship, tattooers might reasonably worry that asserting copyright interests in their own creations might attract unwanted
attention from the many copyright holders in the broader art
world whose works are routinely copied by tattooers. By resolving their internal disputes through informal means, tattooers
reinforce the notion that their creations are somehow apart
from markets for commercial reproductions of most concern to
543
copyright holders.
Taken together, these cultural features of the tattoo industry—its deeply engrained sense of nonconformity and its historically strained relationship with the law—provide an explanation for the emergence of industry norms that might be
sufficient, but is far from complete. Tattooers, though they value creativity, innovation, and independence, are fundamentally
537. Id. at 1069 (Noonan, J. concurring).
538. See generally Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1061 (9th
Cir. 2010); Grossman v. Baumgartner, 17 N.Y.2d 345 (1966).
539. See generally Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 79 (describing
why many tattooers have a problem trusting law enforcement).
540. Id. at 156.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. See id. with Subject 6 at 55 (explaining that to take legal action
against someone who copies your tattoo requires a focus on money that many
tattooers lack).
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market actors. Any account of the development of tattoo industry norms has to consider the economics of contemporary tat544
tooing.
B. TATTOO ECONOMICS
The economics of the tattoo industry differ from those of
traditional copyright-reliant industries in important ways. The
publishing, music, and film industries make money by creating
545
original works and offering them to the public . Sometimes
the work is distributed in copies; sometimes it is performed or
546
displayed publicly. In either case, the goal is to attract as
many paying readers, listeners, or viewers as possible—in
547
short, to have a hit. Broad public access, conditioned on some
548
form of payment, is at the heart of these business models.
Very little of what happens in the tattoo industry follows
549
this basic framework. Commercial flash artists, who generate
tattoo designs and sell copies through industry publications
and internet sites, fit easily within the reproduction-and-sale
550
business model. But the street shops where those designs are
551
transferred to clients do not. Few of the flash designs in any
552
street shop are generated in-house. So while street shops are
in the business of serial-reproduction of copyrighted works,
they are more analogous to the local copy shop than the local

544. See infra Part III.B.
545. See, e.g., Kanye West Announces “The Yeezus Tour,” BILLBOARD (Sept.
6, 2013, 9:44 AM), http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/the-juice/
5687102/kanye-west-announces-the-yeezus-tour (reporting that Kanye West’s
original album “Yeezus” sold 327,000 copies in the first week after release).
546. See id. (announcing that Kanye West will perform his original album
“Yeezus” during his upcoming concert tour).
547. Cf. Mark F. Schultz, Fear & Norms & Rock & Roll: What Jam Bands
Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 651, 657 (2006) (arguing that the music industry needs more than
mere “one-hit wonders” to stay financially viable in the age of copying).
548. Cf. KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF
ECONOMY 6 (2012) (noting that copyright laws enable industries, such as publishing, music and film, to have control over copying in order to encourage innovation); id. (noting that illegal copying is dismantling the music industry’s
old business model).
549. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 6, supra note 8, at 56 (noting an intrinsic difference between other art forms and tattooing).
550. See id. with Subject 1 at 10–11 (describing flash tattoo sales).
551. Id. (noting that buying flash enables a tattooer to make as many copies as they want).
552. Id.; id. with Subject 2 at 24.
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553

book publisher. They make their income by offering copying
services, not by selling or licensing copies of their original
554
works.
The custom tattoo shop is even further removed from pre555
vailing copyright-reliant business models. Custom tattooing
developed as the result of the feedback loop between tattooers
seeking greater opportunity for creative freedom and clients
556
looking for unique and original designs. After decades of custom tattoos and a recent flood of tattoo-centric reality television
programming, custom designs are a firmly established expecta557
tion among clients. “The consciousness of the tattoo community and the client is so much higher than it used to be ten
years ago,” one tattooer told me. “Now everybody wants a cus558
tom tattoo.” Another explained that because “we live in such
a custom tattoo time, anyone that emails you about a tattoo assumes that you’re going to draw something for them. . . . [Cli559
ents] want to make the monkey dance.”
Because of the emphasis clients place on bespoke tattoos,
the custom tattoo market is far more circumspect when it
comes to copying than traditional copyright-reliant indus560
tries. For those industries, the value of the work is propor561
tional to its reproduction. In order to harness that value, exclusive rights limit reproduction to the copyright holder or its
553. Because shops that rely on flash are likely operating under implied
license, they are largely insulated from liability.
554. See Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 67 (describing the work
of a street shop tattooer as a “service”).
555. See, e.g., id. with Subject 2 at 24 (noting that custom shops keep hardly any flash).
556. See, e.g., id. with Subject 6 at 54 (discussing the recent trend in the
tattoo industry toward custom designs).
557. See, e.g., Angel Cohn, Best Ink: Will This Be a Stain on Oxygen’s Permanent Record?, TELEVISION WITHOUT PITY (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www
.televisionwithoutpity.com/telefile/2012/03/best-ink-will-this-go-down-in.php
(noting two tattoo-based competition shows airing on the Oxygen and Spike
networks); 'Tattoo School' Reality Series Coming to TLC, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 3, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/03/tattoo-school-tlc_n_
1475235.html (noting that four tattoo-related reality shows have aired on TLC
alone).
558. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 61.
559. Id. with Subject 3 at 30.
560. Id. with Subject 10 at 97 (“I don’t replicate any of my drawings on anybody else.”).
561. Id. with Subject 8 at 75 (“A logo, for example, is in some sense made to
be reproduced . . . . You’re going to put it on as many things as you can convince people to buy.”).
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562

licensees. But a custom tattoo derives its value largely from
the fact that it will not be reproduced, even by the tattooer who
created it. Reproduction is not limited to the rights holder; it is
563
precluded altogether. As described below, the tattoo industry’s recognition of client demands for unique designs helps explain the development of its norms.
1. Norms as Collective Self-Interest
The classic Demsetzian analysis predicts that formal or informal property rights emerge when their benefits outweigh
their costs, either because the value of exclusivity increases or
564
the cost of enforcement drops. The tattoo industry presents a
narrative that fits reasonably well within this model. As client
demand for custom tattoos increased, so did the harm tattooers
565
felt from appropriation of their designs. And as technology facilitated both the detection of copying and the spread of negative gossip within the geographically dispersed tattoo commu566
nity, enforcement costs plummeted.
This story tells us why tattooers would be motivated to as567
sert a claim, either formal or informal, against copyists. But
it doesn’t explain why tattooers have opted consistently for informal social norms rather than the formal property-like rules
568
of copyright law. So while it’s easy to see why a tattooer
would seek to protect his own work against copying, his commitment to enforcing norms when the work of another member
of the community is copied is not captured by the Demsetzian
569
model.
562. See RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 548, at 6 (“Innovation requires rules that allow creators to control who can make copies—either by
making copies themselves, or selling licenses to others. Creators, in short,
need a monopoly over the right to make copies.”).
563. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 16 (asserting that
the tattooer would not exactly replicate their own tattoo design).
564. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 350 (1967) (arguing that property rights arise in response to changes in the costs and benefits of using and protecting resources).
565. See Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 21–22 (describing the
financial harm of having someone copy your tattoo).
566. See id. at 22–23 (discussing technology-related ways that people become blacklisted by the tattoo community for copying).
567. See, e.g., id. with Subject 6 at 50 (asserting that people who seek legal
recourse for copied designs are after money).
568. Id. with Subject 9 at 94 (claiming that hiring a lawyer to respond to
copied material is “ridiculous”).
569. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Who’s in the Club: A Response to Oliar
and Sprigman, 95 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 1, 4–5 (2009) (noting the need for an
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Propertization alone doesn’t explain tattoo industry norms
because they arise out of collective rather than personal interests. Robert Ellickson, in his foundational study of Shasta
County ranchers, suggested that informal norms take root
when three conditions are satisfied: the relevant community is
close knit, the norms govern workaday affairs, and the norms
570
enhance the collective welfare of the community. Each of these three requirements is met in the tattoo industry.
Ellickson defined a close knit community as “a social network whose members have credible and reciprocal prospects for
the application of power against one another and a good supply
571
of information on past and present internal events.” Although
it is geographically dispersed, the tattoo industry bears the
hallmarks of a close-knit community. Indeed, more than one interview subject used that precise language to describe their in572
dustry. Through a combination of workplace gossip, conversations at regional and national tattoo conventions, and
technology-mediated discussion, tattooers have created a decentralized network for the exchange of industry information,
573
including accusations of copying. And as discussed above,
that exchange of information carries profound social and professional consequences for tattooers accused of transgressing
574
community norms.
The questions governed by tattoo industry norms are
workaday issues, ones tattooers confront professionally on a
daily basis: how to collaborate with clients; how to respond to
client requests for tattoo designs that originate from flash, prior custom work, or commercial art; and how to define their re575
lationship with the images they apply to their clients.
analysis of why IP social norms develop to account for the “dual potential
roles” of community members as both “creators” and “thieves”).
570. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167 (1991) (“[M]embers of a close knit-group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that
members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.” (footnote omitted)).
571. Id. at 181.
572. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 1, supra note 8, at 8–9 (discussing the
importance of being part of a tattoo community).
573. See id. at 9–10 (noting that the community hears about a copier
online, through word of mouth, or at conventions).
574. See supra Part II.D.2.
575. See, e.g., Interview with Subject 2, supra note 8, at 18–19 (discussing
the relationship between the rules against copying and client interactions on a
daily basis).
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Most importantly, tattoo norms enhance the welfare of the
576
community. Ellickson understood welfare-maximizing norms
as those that minimize both transaction costs and deadweight
577
loss associated with unexploited trade.
From a tattooer’s
short-term perspective, defection from the norm against copy578
ing is an attractive strategy. By free riding on the efforts of
another custom tattooer, she can avoid the opportunity cost associated with drawing up an original design, and because she is
paid only for the hours spent tattooing, her compensation holds
579
constant. Similar incentives could encourage a tattooer to violate the norm favoring client autonomy. By extracting rents
from a client whose public display or other use of the tattoo develops economic value, the tattooer appears to benefit from a
windfall.
But once client expectations are taken into account, those
short-term strategies reveal themselves as collectively harm580
ful. Clients expect unique tattoos, and they expect considera581
ble freedom to display and use the images on their bodies.
Tattooers who upset those settled expectations run the risk of
582
undermining the market for custom tattoos. If clients who
desire bespoke tattoos fear that their design will be subsequently tattooed on other clients, or perhaps even worse, that a
design they thought was custom-designed was in fact a copy of
a preexisting tattoo, they may well spend their money on a mo583
torcycle or some other symbol of youthful rebellion instead.
Likewise, if clients worry that their tattooer will assert some
control over their use of the tattoo, they will either insist on
contractual guarantees against such interference, demand lower prices to offset this risk, or simply opt out of the tattoo mar576. See id. with Subject 1 at 8–9 (describing what copying does to one’s
ability to participate in the tattoo community and the benefit of being in such
a community).
577. ELLICKSON, supra note 570, at 184.
578. Interview with Subject 3, supra note 8, at 33 (noting that money and a
lack of enforcement are benefits to copying—“At the end of the day, [the copyist] knows they can [copy]”).
579. See id. with Subject 7 at 58 (noting how “the old timers” made money
through copying).
580. See id. at 61 (describing the “individual spirit” of tattooing).
581. Cf. id. with Subject 2 at 21–22 (noting that when a client purchases a
tattoo, they have the right to display it).
582. Cf. id. with Subject 7 at 62 (discussing the fact that people who seek
custom tattoos want an original design that will not be copied).
583. Cf. id. with Subject 13 at 142 (discussing the unspoken agreement between client and tattooer that the tattoo is original and will not be copied).
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584

ket altogether. For the tattoo industry, the creation and enforcement of informal norms is a small price to pay for avoiding
the erosion of client demand and the increase in transaction
585
costs associated with defectors.
Ellickson’s framework also helps explain why street shops
are less likely to follow tattoo industry norms. To the extent
street shop tattooers are part of the same community as custom
tattooers, they are on its fringes. The social power custom
tattooers wield over one another is less potent within the street
shop community because it deemphasizes creativity and origi586
nality. And because their clients are, as a rule, less interested
in one-of-a-kind designs, street shop tattooers are insulated
from erosion of the custom tattoo market that results from vio587
lations of the anti-copying norm. In other words, the norm
against copying is not obviously welfare enhancing for street
588
shop tattooers as a subgroup of the wide tattoo community.
However, given the nebulous distinction between street and
custom tattooing and the mobility of individual tattooers along
that professional spectrum, it would be easy to overstate the in589
centives for defection.
Other non-IP norms within the tattoo industry confirm
that collective self-interest motivates tattooers. Tattooers generally accept a number of self-imposed restrictions that are best
understood as efforts to preserve the reputational and economic
590
interests of the profession as a whole. For example, most tattoo shops refuse to tattoo clients’ faces and—until recently—
hands because of the social stigma and economic consequences

584. Id.
585. This explanation is consistent with norms outside of the IP context
that emerge when a group derives collective economic benefit from them. See,
e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).
586. See generally Interview with Subject 8, supra note 8, at 65–80 (discussing the tattoo industry from the perspective of a street shop tattooer).
587. Cf. id. at 66 (noting that a tattoo is a luxury item, and therefore, the
client should get what they want).
588. Id.
589. See id. with Subject 2 at 24 (identifying the blurred line between custom tattooing and street shops).
590. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 233. See also #electricalivia, TUMBLR
(Sept. 26, 2013; 12:08 PM), http://electricalivia.tumblr.com/post/51739086191/
hand-neck-finger-face-tattoos.
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591

still attached to highly visible tattoos. For similar reasons,
most tattoo shops turn away customers seeking tattoos associ592
ated with gangs or hate groups. Those norms could be seen as
593
expressions of tattooers’ own personal preferences. However,
in the aggregate, they discourage short-term personal economic
gains for the sake of the collective maintenance of industry594
wide market demand. But as described below, these same
self-protective instincts sometimes translate into exclusionary
anti-competitive practices.
2. Norms as Exclusionary Practices
In some ways, the tattoo industry resembles an informal
595
596
guild. It maintains trade secrets. It regulates entry into the
597
profession. And relatedly, it excludes potential competitors in
598
order to limit competition. These efforts offer a supplemental
explanation for tattoo industry norms, particularly the norm
599
against copying custom designs.
The tattoo industry has long been characterized by secre600
cy. Tattooing requires a host of arcane technical knowledge

591. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 233. See also #electricalivia, supra note
590.
592. Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 151.
593. See id.
594. Cf. id. with Subject 7 at 61 (observing that the aversion to copying in
the tattoo community is connected to client desires for custom tattoos).
595. Id.
596. See ROBERT P. MERGES, FROM MEDIEVAL GUILDS TO OPEN SOURCE
SOFTWARE: INFORMAL NORMS, APPROPRIABILITY INSTITUTIONS, AND INNOVATION 5–7 (2004) (describing the role medieval guilds played in protecting trade
secrets).
597. Id. (describing apprenticeship systems within guilds).
598. See Gary Richardson, Guilds, Laws, and Markets for Manufactured
Merchandise in Late-Medieval England, in EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 41 (2004) 1, 1–2 (citing NORMAN CANTOR, MEDIEVAL READER 278 (1994)
(noting that “‘craft guilds’ . . . main purpose and activity was narrow regulation of industrial productivity in order to restrain competition”)); DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 134 (1981) (noting
the “guilds organized to protect local artisans . . . [and preserve] local monopolies against encroachment from outside competition”).
599. Norms of exclusion can be particularly powerful and attractive to a
community. See RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF GROUP CONFLICT 107 (1995) (arguing that the most powerful norms benefit group members at the expense of non-members).
600. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 233–34; SANDERS, supra note 72, at 70.
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601

traditionally unavailable to the general public. Historically,
tattooers built and repaired their own equipment and mixed
their own pigments, to say nothing of the technique necessary
to execute a passable tattoo without causing a client inordinate
602
pain. Until very recently, this information was shrouded in
603
mystery.
As one tattooer described past generations of
tattooers, “[T]hey were like magicians; they were able to hold
604
onto those secrets of how to tattoo.” Another said of tattooing:
605
“[I]t’s this old, magical art. It’s behind the curtain.”
By guarding this information closely, tattooers were able to
606
carefully limit entry into the trade. For most of the history of
tattooing in the United States, tattooers learned either through
a time consuming process of trial and error, or, more commonly,
607
through an apprenticeship with an established tattooer.
There were no tattoo schools, no how-to guides, no correspond608
ence courses, and no YouTube videos.
Tattooers even withheld information from each other. One
tattooer explained, “Tattoo artists would never share information. They would tell you wrong information. Sailor Jerry
was notorious for that. He’d hide little things in his drawings or
609
leave little things out.” As more skilled artists took up tattooing, anti-competitive concerns drove further efforts to maintain
secrecy: “[The old timers] were afraid that if everybody knew
that information, the quality level would go up so high, they
610
couldn’t compete. Because they weren’t very good artists.”
Tattoo equipment and supply distributors, eager to exploit
the untapped market of aspiring tattooers, challenged this
longstanding secrecy by marketing pre-assembled tattoo ma611
chines, ready-made pigments, and instructional materials.
601. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 235 (explaining how tattooers not only
use flash, but create custom designs from other cultures, understand how to
properly outline and color tattoos, and practice safe sanitation techniques).
602. See id. at 233–34.
603. Id. at 234 (listing the books, newsletters, and conventions which now
disseminate tattoo trade secrets).
604. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 59.
605. Id. with Subject 8 at 78.
606. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 234 (describing the “small nucleus” of secretive independent leaders who controlled the industry).
607. SANDERS, supra note 72, at 70.
608. Id.
609. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 59.
610. Id.
611. See DEMELLO, supra note 29, at 110.
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Today, the widespread availability of information on the Internet further disrupts the traditional control tattooers exerted of
612
the secrets of their trade. Some tattooers expressed concern
about the impact of this free flow of information:
[P]eople are being too open with stuff . . . [b]ecause there’s too many
people . . . . [P]eople are too accepting [and] just let people into the industry . . . . There are way too many people in the industry now. It
used to be tattooers were fucking rich . . . . [Y]ou did well for what you
613
did, and it’s not like that anymore.

One way to understand the norm against copying is as an
effort to reconstruct something akin to the entry barriers secrecy once provided. Custom tattooing involves two distinct skill
sets. First, it requires technical skill—that is, a working understanding of how to translate a given design onto the client’s
614
body. A good tattooer must understand how to operate her
machine, the choice between various needle configurations, and
the unique characteristics of human skin, among other specialized knowledge. Second, custom tattooing requires the ability to
615
conceive of and execute original designs. In addition to an
understanding of composition, color theory, and a variety of artistic styles, custom design requires creativity, imagination,
616
and time.
Old school tattooers limited market entry by controlling access to technical information necessary to develop this first set
617
of skills. Today’s tattooers, though they have largely lost control over those once valuable trade secrets, can rely on the second set of skills to regulate their trade. By emphasizing original designs, in part through the anti-copying norm, custom
tattooers have shaped the market in a way that reduces competition from street shop tattooers and new market entrants who
may have technical skill but lack the talent or inclination to
create one-of-a-kind designs for their clients.
Taken together, skepticism about the legal system, the collective interest in satisfying client expectations, and the desire
612. See, e.g., Learn How to Tattoo Step by Step on Video!, LEARN HOW TO
TATTOO (Sept. 17, 2013), http://learn-tattoo.com (advertising books, software,
and videos teaching how to tattoo).
613. Interview with Subject 9, supra note 8, at 94.
614. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 235 (noting the “careful attention”
tattooers demonstrate when working).
615. Id.
616. See id. at 235 (noting “outstanding artists usually charge by the
hour”).
617. Id.
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to limit competition within the trade explain why the tattoo industry relies on norms rather than formal intellectual property
protection and why its norms reflect the particular set of obligations described above. The next Part turns to the broader
implications of tattoo industry norms for intellectual property
law and policy.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE TATTOO INDUSTRY
Because tattoo industry norms are largely a function of idiosyncratic cultural and market characteristics, we might expect
them to resist generalizable insights. Outside of other communities or industries with deeply rooted antagonism toward the
legal system, the cultural origins of tattoo industry norms tell
us little about whether and how we should expect intellectual
property norms to develop elsewhere. Nonetheless, two features
of the tattoo market offer broadly applicable lessons. First, the
tattoo industry’s client-driven incentive structure reinforces the
notion that formal intellectual property protection imposes uniformity costs when it ignores the creative dynamics within particular communities. Second, the tattoo industry’s focus on the
provision of personal services, rather than the multiplication
and sale of copies, might serve as a useful model for other creative industries struggling with the ubiquity of copying.
A. THE ROLE OF NON-LEGAL INCENTIVES
Copyright and patent exclusivity exist to spur the creation
of public goods that would go unproduced but for those legally
constructed incentives because of the ready appropriability of
618
their value by competitors. An ideally calibrated intellectual
property system would provide just enough incentive to prompt
619
the creation of new works. Any incentives beyond the bare
minimum impose unnecessary costs on the public in the form of
618. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (“The foundation for
the American patent system is purely economic.”); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 209, at 2110 (explaining the economic incentive theory for copyright).
619. See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1249 (1998) (arguing copyright should “give creators
enough entitlements to induce them to produce the works from which we all
benefit but no more”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit,
and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5
(2004) (suggesting patent protection should be conferred only to the “precise
extent[] necessary to secure each individual innovation’s ex ante expected profitability”).
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higher prices, reduced availability, and restrictions on the use
620
of creative works.
Not all creators require the same incentives. Some face
621
higher upfront costs or greater threats of appropriation. And
they create against different backdrops of non-legal and even
622
non-pecuniary incentives. These conditions, and thus optimal
incentives, vary from author to author, perhaps even from work
623
to work. And they vary considerably from industry to indus624
try.
But the rights intellectual property law confers are insensitive to fluctuations in the incentives necessary to induce crea625
tive production. Intellectual property protections are uniform.
An author who will create only if promised a significant return
on her opportunity costs receives the same level of copyright
protection as one who creates purely out of a love for her
626
craft. By creating and enforcing rights without regard to context, intellectual property imposes uniformity costs through
627
both over- and under-incentivizing innovation.
620. See generally Fred Anthony Rowley, Jr., Dynamic Copyright Law: Its
Problems and a Possible Solution, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 481, 487 (1998) (explaining the dangers of overbroad copyright protection, and even declaring
that such protection leads to “legal constraints upon the ability of individuals
to think about, discuss, and examine . . . ideas and facts”).
621. See Kieff, supra note 618, at 724–25 (describing the unique challenges
of the biotechnology industry which faces incredibly high initial research and
development costs).
622. See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive
Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 624 (2011) (arguing “[n]ew strains of
thinking in the fields of economics, psychology, and business management
studies now debunk the long-venerated” thought that people only create for
economic incentives).
623. See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 856 (2006) (describing how
copyright law grants the same protection to any type of literary work, including different types of software).
624. Id. at 857 (“Even when all creators within an industry or technological
field face roughly the same type and magnitude of appropriability problem, the
magnitude and type of problem will certainly vary among industries and technological fields.”).
625. See id. at 846–47 (describing the costs imposed by uniform intellectual
property law given the variation in creative practices among industries); Dan
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575
(2003) (noting the inefficiency of uniform patent law in light of differing costs
of innovation across industries).
626. See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 522–27 (2009) (discussing the roles
of compulsion and love in the creative process).
627. See Carroll, supra note 623, at 847.
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As Oliar and Sprigman point out in their study of standup
comics, social norms highlight these uniformity costs and may
628
provide limited relief from them. To the extent norms form
part of the backdrop of existing non-legal incentives, they suggest a more modest need for the additional legal incentives of
intellectual property. Standup comedians produce new original
material in the absence of meaningful copyright protection in
629
part because community norms reward that behavior. Because tattoo industry norms serve as an alternative to formal
law rather than a substitute for it, they underscore the importance of non-legal incentives even more dramatically.
There are two interrelated sources of non-legal incentives
in the tattoo industry. First, and most directly, tattooers create
630
new original designs because clients demand them. In order
to attract clients willing to pay for their tattoo services,
631
tattooers produce designs at no direct cost to the client. Tattoo industry norms are partly an outgrowth of that market demand for unique designs. But once those norms are established,
they reinforce the existing market-based incentives with social
ones.
Where non-legal incentives—whether norm-based or market-based—pervade a creative community, the risk of uniformity costs from over-protection is particularly high, and we
should be particularly skeptical about the need for copyright
protection. Even if tattooers were denied copyright altogether,
these non-legal incentives suggest that their creative output
would remain unchanged.
So while existing copyright doctrine surely protects tattoos,
they would likely be excluded under a copyright regime more
632
attuned to the realities of creative production. The tattoo industry is far from alone in this regard. Nor is it especially de633
634
serving of exclusion. State laws, local building codes, pri-

628. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1840–41.
629. Id.
630. Interview with Subject 13, supra note 8, at 145.
631. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 235 (noting the initial consultation is
“gratis”).
632. See Tattoo Art Inc. v. TAT Int’l LLC, 498 F. App’x 341 (4th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam) (affirming copyright infringement of a tattoo).
633. See James Grimmelmann, Copyright, Technology, and Access to the
Law: An Opinionated Primer (June 19, 2008), http://james.grimmelmann.net/
essays/CopyrightTechnologyAccess.
634. Id.
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636

vate standards,
publicly financed research,
and perhaps
637
even sure-fire blockbuster movies are all susceptible to similar critiques.
While tattoo industry norms highlight the problem of uniformity costs, they might also mitigate them. Among the costs
of over-protection are the expense and strain on the judicial
system associated with enforcement of intellectual property
rights. But tattoo industry norms include a built-in safeguard
against those costs: the meta-norm of rejecting reliance on for638
So long as tattooers and other creative
mal legal rights.
communities continue to resolve their disputes internally, they
avoid imposing the shared public costs of adjudication and enforcement. In short, some of the risks of over-protection may
dissipate if the members of a creative community consistently
disclaim formal rights.
Tattooers, like standup comedians, chefs, and roller derby
enthusiasts, should remind policymakers that incentives for
creative production take many forms. An intellectual property
policy structured around the expectations of a handful of publishers and distributors in a handful of industries that rose to
prominence in the last century is one that neglects the prospect
of new creative dynamics and markets in favor of inertia. And
as the next section discusses, the tattoo industry—despite its
status as one of humanity’s oldest forms of creativity—may offer copyright-reliant industries hints at a new way forward.
B. CUSTOMIZATION & SERVICE
Embedded in our copyright system are assumptions about
the business models of creative industries. The copyright system envisions a world in which rights holders produce copies of
639
their works and distribute them to the public. But technology
has made copying cheaper, easier, and faster, threatening the
635. See Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyright in Standards, 48 B.C.
L. REV. 193 (2007).
636. See Samuel E. Trosow, Copyright Protection for Federally Funded Research: Necessary Incentive or Double Subsidy?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
613 (2004).
637. See Mike Masnick, Does Batman Need Copyright Protection?,
TECHDIRT (July 20, 2012, 8:24 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120
719/18025319772/does-batman-need-copyright-protection.shtml.
638. See Rubin, supra note 19, at 234 (mentioning that leaders in the tattoo
field solve their own legal problems and create requisite legal systems).
639. See Michael J. Madison, of Coase and Comics, or, the Comedy of Copyright, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 27, 34 (2009).
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640

fundamental premise of this business model. Using a number
of strategies, rights holders have responded with mixed results.
They have waged war on intermediaries that enable or facili641
tate alleged infringement. They have targeted their own cus642
tomers in massive litigation dragnets. They have encumbered
their products with digital rights management technologies
that simultaneously decrease their value and alienate consum643
ers. Because the tattoo industry relies on a very different
strategy to extract value from its original works, it may offer
some lessons for other creative industries seeking to wean
themselves from over-reliance on control over the reproduction
of copies.
Two facts about the tattoo industry separate it from most
copyright-reliant industries. First, as discussed above, the contemporary tattoo industry emphasizes custom, one-of-a-kind
644
designs rather than mass production. Second, tattooers do
not sell products. As they see it, they are in a service profession. They sell an experience, perhaps even an attitude. Clients
don’t pay for a drawing; they pay for the time the tattooer
spends rendering that image on their skin. As one tattooer told
me, “The image is just what happens to be left after you spend
a moment in time with a particular person. It’s an intangible
645
object.” A custom tattoo requires the client and tattooer to
spend many hours in a physically—and occasionally emotionally—intimate setting. As a result, clients look for interpersonal
skill as well as artistic and technical expertise when choosing a
tattooer:
I’m a cute, young, friendly girl. ’That is the difference . . . . [My coworkers] are all grumpy old men. When people get tattooed by me,
they’re paying for a whole experience. They’re like, “Oh, she’s really
fun; she’s really sweet; she’s really cute; she’s upbeat; she’s silly. I’m
646
going to get this fun, cute tattoo. It’s great.”
640. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 209, at 2068 (describing how
technology instantaneously helps us infringe copyright, even unintentionally).
641. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913 (2005); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.
2007); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
642. See Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating
P2P in the Decade After Napster, 40 RUTGERS L. J. 565, 602–05 (2009).
643. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of
the Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BGM Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 1157 (2007).
644. See Rubin, supra note 19.
645. Interview with Subject 7, supra note 8, at 64.
646. Id. with Subject 12 at 128.
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Because tattooers provide value through client experience
and service rather than the mere provision of copies, they resemble some other notable outliers in the world of intellectual
property business models. Jambands, most notably the Grateful Dead, earned their reputation and their fortune not through
647
the sale of records, but through live performance. “The Grateful Dead made each show a unique experience, presenting a
648
unique set list and improvising heavily.” Much like custom
tattooers, the value the Grateful Dead provided was a function
of a customized experience largely immune from mass reproduction.
Tattooers also share something in common with companies
that monetize open source software. Because the software itself
is typically available at no charge, open source firms often derive revenue not from selling copies, but by providing ancillary
training and support services customized to meet the needs of
649
each client. Much like these open source firms, we could describe tattooers—who charge for their time but not their drawings—as giving away the recipe but opening a restaurant that
650
will execute it.
This Article does not advocate that the music, film, and
publishing industries jettison their current business models in
favor of one patterned on the Grateful Dead or Sailor Jerry.
But taking service and experience seriously could help copy651
right-reliant industries adapt to new market conditions.
Some more traditional copyright holders have already begun to embrace the shift from distributing mass-produced copies to providing customized, personalized service. Former major
label recording artist Mike Doughty recently began selling
652
unique, personalized recordings of his song “Dogs/Demons.”
647. See Schultz, supra note 547, at 669.
648. Id.
649. See Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do
Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 34 (2006) (arguing that
the “open source model leans ineluctably toward services firms”); Susan
Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793, 834
(2001) (noting that “[t]he purchaser. . . does not buy the actual product, which
is available free of charge, but instead pays for . . . services”).
650. See Scafidi, supra note 649, at 832 (citing ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 165 (1999)).
651. See RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 548, 179–184 (2012) (noting
the role experience and personal service play in limiting copying in food, movie, and music industries).
652. Mike Masnick, Musician Mike Doughty Offers Unique Copy of His
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Each recording incorporates its date, location, and the full legal
653
name of the purchaser. In addition, purchasers can choose
between three keys for their recording, all for a mere $543.09
654
per copy.
Doughty’s experimental business model is at least in part
an exercise in performance art. But other industries are emphasizing those aspects of their offerings that remain difficult
to copy. The gaming industry’s focus on online multiplayer
games can be viewed as an effort to entice consumers with services and experiences that are far harder to duplicate than the
655
mere contents of a disc. Even the resurgence of 3D movies
demonstrates Hollywood’s awareness of the need to offer cus656
tomers an experience that they cannot replicate at home.
Tattooing, because it has always functioned primarily as a service industry, and one that made the transition from mass production to bespoke craftsmanship decades ago, illuminates one
path forward for other creative industries frustrated by the ever-decreasing value of the copy.
CONCLUSION
The tattoo, though formally embraced by the copyright system, fits rather awkwardly in any property regime. “Where
classical economic theory recognizes three types of property:
the intellectual, the real . . . and the movable . . . tattoo announces itself as a fourth type: a property that is at once mobile
657
and inalienable.”
Although they are unlikely to express
themselves in terms of property theory, tattooers see their work
as a sui generis amalgam of art, commerce, and human tradition. Perhaps then, it is not entirely surprising that they have
opted to regulate this unique form of expression with rules
crafted and enforced within their community.
New Song, Personalized to Each Buyer, for $543.09, TECHDIRT (Dec. 11, 2012,
8:01 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/blog/casestudies/articles/20121207/1002382
1309/musician-mike-doughty-offers-unique-copy-his-new-song-personalized-to
-each-buyer-54309.shtml.
653. Id.
654. Id.
655. See generally Brandon Dixon, Does Every Game Have to Have Multiplayer?, EPICSLASH (May 1, 2012), http://www.epicslash.com/does-every-game
-have-to-have-multiplayer (noting the ubiquity of online multiplayer games).
656. See generally Mike Cameo, The Comeback of the 3D Film: A New
Trend for a New Decade of Films, YAHOO VOICES (Jan. 18, 2010), http://voices
.yahoo.com/the-comeback-3d-film-trend-new-5287419.html (noting the resurgence of 3D theatrical releases).
657. Fleming, supra note 34, at 66–67.
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The norms tattooers have developed serve a number of
overlapping purposes. They protect both the relationship between tattooer and client and the underlying assertion of personal sovereignty the tattoo represents by guaranteeing client
autonomy. They simultaneously preserve tradition by encouraging the use of flash designs and encourage innovation by protecting custom designs from copying. And they give tattooers
valuable tools for cultivating market demand for their services
and controlling competition within their trade.
But the value of these norms is not confined to tattooers
and their clients. They offer the rest of us something as well.
They demonstrate that the assumptions upon which we base
intellectual property law are empirically untested and myopically focused on a tiny sliver of overall creative production defined by legacy business models. But the tattoo industry’s ability to withstand dramatic shifts in its means of creative
production in recent decades suggests that other industries can
successfully evolve to meet the changing demands of consumers. And finally, the persistence of tattooing across cultures,
continents, and millennia reminds us that the human need for
creative production transcends the contingencies of markets
and law.

